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IDPs arriving to the PoC sites are provided with temporary accommodation prior to being relocated to new shelters. In the Bentiu PoC site, a woman waits in a temporary shelter in the 
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Over 2,300 shelters were damaged or destroyed during the February 2016 attack on the Malakal PoC site. © IOM 2016 Photo: Gonzalez
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Foreword   by Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights of Internally Displaced Persons
On 9 July 2011, South Sudan became the world’s newest nation, invoking feelings of hope, pride and stability 
among Southern Sudanese who had suffered through decades of war, famine and hardship. Tragically, less than 
four years later, South Sudan is embroiled in another vicious civil war, internally displacing nearly 1.7 million 
people. Millions live under the constant threat of violence, with limited access to even the most basic services. 
 
When I was appointed to my current position as Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights of Internally Displaced 
Persons (IDPs), only eight months prior to South Sudan’s independence, I rejoiced with the world community in 
the great optimism for the people of this new country. Only two and half years later, I was angered and saddened 
by the renewal of warfare in South Sudan in December 2013. I had undertaken an official mission to South 
Sudan in November 2013, approximately a month before the outbreak of the armed conflict. I was struck by 
the absence of formal structures and systems for the protection of IDPs both on the part of the United Nations 
Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) and the Government of South Sudan. I had urged that these be established as 
a matter of urgency but events took over in December 2013. I returned to South Sudan to undertake a working 
visit to address the situation of IDPs in the PoC sites in September 2015 and received positive responses from 
the leadership of the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS), and the Protection Cluster.
 
As established by the 1998 Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, the 2006 International Conference of 
the Great Lakes' Protocol, and the 2009 African Union Convention for the Protection and Assistance of Internally 
Displaced Persons, the primary duty to protect and provide assistance to IDPs rests with the national authorities. 
Consequently, the vast majority of IDPs in South Sudan today are seeking protection from the government itself, 
and yet its capacity to do so is severely constrained.
 
Therefore, I am enormously proud of the action taken by UNMISS for having opened their gates to protect 
civilians fleeing the violence with nowhere else to turn. More than 100,000 people sought protection at UNMISS 
compounds within the first six months of the conflict, and this figure doubled after the long “fighting season” 
in 2015. It is an unprecedented achievement, in so far as conditions allow, for a UN peacekeeping mission to 
provide protection for 200,000 people within their bases. Alongside the peacekeeping mission, UN and relief 
agencies have proved indispensable by providing life-saving humanitarian services at both UNMISS Protection 
of Civilian (PoC) sites and numerous IDP settlements throughout the country in which the majority of IDPs reside, 
including in host families and communities.
 
This report takes a critical look at the protection of civilians in South Sudan and presents lessons learned during 
the first two years of the conflict. The research brings to light challenges of the protection of civilians in a volatile 
environment through the voices of more than 100 interviewees from UNMISS, humanitarian agencies and, most 
importantly, the IDP community itself. My sincere hope is that this report leads to an open discussion among 
key actors, improving the response and protection offered to IDPs in UNMISS bases. Ultimately, the primary 
mandates of UNMISS and humanitarians are the same: the protection of civilians. It is critically important that 
both work together toward this common objective.  
 
I am pleased to provide the foreword to this report and trust it will be of practical assistance to UNMISS and 
UN and non-governmental humanitarian actors.  I am appreciative to the Government of Switzerland and the 
International Organization for Migration (IOM) for their support, and, especially, to Michael Arensen for writing 
this important report.
Dr Chaloka Beyani
Chaloka Beyani is the United Nations Special Rapporteur on 
the Human Rights of Internally Displaced Persons. He is also 
an Associate Professor of International Law, a member of the 
Centre for the Study of Human Rights and Chair of its Advisory 
Board, and a member of the Centre for Climate Change at the 
London School of Economics and Political Science.
Daily life in the Malakal PoC site where women and children are the majority of residents. © IOM 2015 Photo: Brendan Bannon
9Violence broke out in South Sudan in December 2013, forcing tens of thousands of 
internally displaced persons (IDPs) to seek protection at United Nations peacekeeping 
bases, leading to an unprecedented situation for both the UN Department of 
Peacekeeping Operations and humanitarian agencies. Due to the scale of violence 
of the crisis, the desperate and immediate needs in the newly termed protection 
of civilian (PoC) sites have been overwhelming and required considerable flexibility 
to save lives and mitigate the impacts of the conflict. The rapid onset of the crisis 
required the UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) to respond to humanitarian 
needs at the start of the conflict while also requiring humanitarian actors to provide 
lifesaving services inside a military base—an unlikely combination. 
Not surprisingly, this unique situation has led to considerable differences between 
stakeholders that function under very different systems and mandates. Significant 
challenges in the coordination of the response, both between humanitarian agencies 
and with UNMISS, and the need to define the differing roles and responsibilities 
have necessitated the establishment of guidelines and synchronized mechanisms to 
facilitate effective processes. Hosting IDP camps in UN bases has also generated a 
number of new challenges, including the enforcement of the rule of law by a body 
without an executive mandate and the formation of leadership structures to organize 
IDPs and mitigate violence. 
The PoC sites have been a considerable achievement for UNMISS, which is 
protecting more than 200,000 IDPs on a daily basis. Despite the success of the PoC 
sites as a protection mechanism, much debate has arisen over their sustainability 
and the resources they demand from the mission. Recent studies have established 
that PoC sites in the conflict states continue to serve as a vital coping mechanism 
and the only locations where families affected by shocks from the ongoing war can 
find a consistent level of protection and services. 
The slow implementation of the peace agreement will ensure the PoC sites remain 
necessary for years to come. Stakeholders need to improve coordination and 
establish shared multi-year plans for the continued existence of the PoC sites, as 
well as the eventual facilitation of safe and voluntary returns for IDPs. 
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115,014**
202*
Bentiu
Wau
Bor
• Primarily Nuer.
• Beginning 18 December 2013, IDPs sought protection at 
UNMISS Bor. 
• Control of the town changed hands several times between 
January and April 2014, and the composition of IDPs at 
UNMISS Bor PoC site changed accordingly.
• On 17 April 2014, Dinka militias attacked IDPs located 
within the UNMISS compound. 47 IDPs were killed, dozens 
were injured and 2 were abducted.
• UNMISS built a new PoC adjacent to the UNMISS base, 
and by October 2014 all IDPs had been relocated to the 
new site. 
• In 2015, UNMISS and humanitarians attempted to relocate 
IDPs to areas of their choice outside of Bor, but the 
Government stopped the relocation.
Bentiu
• Primarily Nuer.
• On 18 December 2013 civilians began entering the UNMISS 
Bentiu to escape fighting.
• In early April 2014, opposition forces captured Bentiu town 
following intense fighting and grave human rights violations. 
Fearing reprisal attacks, the number of Nuer civilians 
entering the PoC site swelled to 40,000 within six weeks.
• The 2014 rainy season came early and stayed long – 
June to October. IDPs remained at the PoC site in horrific 
conditions, many areas were flooded in up to a meter of 
standing water.
• Humanitarian donors provided USD 18 million to renovate 
and expand the UNMISS Bentiu PoC site, and by July 2015 
the work was largely completed.
• The 2015 rainy season came late and was short, allowing 
more ‘fighting time,’ and resulted in a huge influx. The 
number of IDPs at the UNMISS Bentiu PoC site increased 
from 40,000 to over 115,000.
Wau
• Primarily Nuer.
• On 26 April 2014, IDPs sought protection at the UNMISS 
Wau compound, fleeing Sudan People's Liberation Army 
(SPLA) fighting.
• In 2015 UNMISS and humanitarians attempted to relocate 
IDPs to areas of their choice outside of Wau, but the 
Government stopped the relocation.
UNMISS Protection of Civilian Sites
(PoC Sites)
General Situation Map
Total IDPs under protection: more than 240,000
10 - Lessons Learned from South Sudan Protection of Civilian Sites
UPPER
NILE
ETHIOPIA
KENyA
UGANDA
SUDAN
JONGLEI
EASTERN
EQUATORIA
CENTRAL
EQUATORIA
Malakal
47,020*/***
*
**
*** 
IOM biometric registration
IOM population count
Malakal PoC biometric number includes approximately 4,000 
IDPs that left Malakal PoC to Malakal Town after the clashes 
in the PoC on February 2016
Juba
Bor
Melut
668*
2,283**
27,983*
Melut
• Primarily Nuer.
• Current population of 664 individuals.
• On 24–27 December 2014, Nuer IDPs were brought by 
the County Commissioner from Melut town and Paloich as 
tension rose between Dinka and Nuer security forces. Nuer 
forces departed the area to join the IO, leaving behind the 
vulnerable to seek refugee within Melut POC. Personal 
intervention of the County Commissioner brokered the 
safe passage into the PoC for the Nuer.
Malakal
• The only mixed tribe PoC, with a population of Shilluk (80%), 
Nuer, Dinka and Darfuri IDPs. 
• On 24 December 2013, 20,000 IDPs entered the UNMISS base. 
Control of Malakal Town has changed hands a dozen times 
since the conflict began.
• By July 2014, UNMISS and humanitarians had built a PoC 
adjacent to the UNMISS base. Nearly all IDPs were relocated 
immediately, however 3,500 Nuer IDPs remained within the 
base. They refused to move to the new PoC due to security 
reasons.
• IDP population remained stable at 22,000 – from June 2014 
until April 2015. In May 2015, the Shilluk Commander switched 
sides from Government to Opposition, and Shilluk civilians fled 
to the PoC to escape intense fighting. 
• Between May and August 2015, the IDP population increased 
from 22,000 to over 47,000, resulting in the site becoming 
dangerously congested and vulnerable to disease, fire and 
inter-ethnic fighting.
• On 17/18 February 2016, armed militia entered UNMISS Malakal 
PoC. 19 IDPs were killed and 108 were injured. None of the Dinka 
or Darfuri shelters were destroyed, but all Nuer shelters were 
burned to the ground as well as a huge swathe of Shilluk shelters 
throughout the PoC. All Dinka and Darfuri IDPs departed to 
Malakal Town before and during the fighting. 30,000 Shilluk and 
Nuer IDPs fled the PoC area, to seek protection further within the 
UNMISS base. They now live in horrific conditions. Humanitarians 
are rebuilding the site.
Juba
• Primarily Nuer.
• Starting 15 December 2013, IDPs sought protection at two 
UNMISS bases, UNMISS Tongping and UN House.
• By December 2014, all IDPs at UNMISS Tongping had been 
relocated to a prepared site adjacent to UN House called PoC 
3. As of January 2016, there were approximately 20,500 IDPs 
at PoC 3.
• PoC 1 is located within the UN House base. This population 
poses a safety and security risk to UNMISS. As of January 
2016, there were approximately 13,000 IDPs at PoC 1.
• Figures for both PoC 1 and PoC 3 are estimates. The initial 
population came from Juba, but since April 2015, there have 
been new arrivals, primarily from the area formerly known as 
Unity State.
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For the past two years, UNMISS and humanitarian actors have worked side-by-side 
in a coordinated and mostly harmonious manner at the PoC sites in South Sudan. 
The lessons learned identified below should not detract from the overall positive 
engagement and interaction that takes place on a daily basis.
1. UNMISS and humanitarians act as if the PoC sites are temporary facilities, even 
though there is good reason to believe that some of those sites, in particular Malakal 
and Bentiu, will be in existence for several years. As such, there needs to be longer-
term planning and funding for this likely eventuality. UNMISS and humanitarians 
must agree on minimum standards in providing a safe and secure environment for 
displaced persons.
2. UNMISS and humanitarians sometimes plan and act in isolation of one another, 
despite sharing the same core mandate: protection of civilians. Both sides should 
listen to one another, appreciate the separate (but linked) roles and responsibilities, 
and strive to maximize the complementarity in the different approaches to providing 
protection of civilians.  
3. UNMISS and humanitarians attempt to do more than what can be achieved. 
Objectives should be established and prioritized based upon what is realistic.  
4. UNMISS and humanitarian actors often respond without a good analysis of the 
situation. They should increase their institutional knowledge of the history, culture and 
context of South Sudan in order to improve programming and, especially, account for 
the principle of “do no harm.”
5. UNMISS and humanitarian actors should prioritize the practical implementation of 
policy, research and analysis rather than just its creation. These are only beneficial if 
applied and should be a means to improving the response and carrying out reforms, 
rather than the end itself. 
6. Humanitarian actors, including humanitarian donors, have focused almost exclusively 
on emergency response activities over the past two years. Emergency relief activities 
are commendable—they save lives—but they do not result in enduring achievements 
that will benefit the people in the long term. All humanitarians need to move to longer-
term funding cycles that incorporate resilience building.
7. Humanitarians are reliant upon UNMISS for logistics and Force Protection escorts; 
the demand often being beyond the capacity of UNMISS with the given resource 
constraints. Humanitarians must become more independent and less risk averse.    
8. Since early 2014, there have been several, often overlapping, initiatives aimed at the 
relocation of displaced persons out of the protection of civilians areas with limited 
success. UNMISS and humanitarians need to be realistic and pragmatic while 
engaging IDPs constructively to find solutions to their protracted displacement.
Recommendations
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Qualitative and empirical research methodologies were employed in the data 
collection process. The researcher carried out over 100 interviews, including semi-
structured interviews, focus group discussions and key informant interviews. 
Respondents included UNMISS, UN and international non-governmental organization 
(INGO) personnel, as well as IDPs in the Bentiu, Bor, Juba and Malakal PoC sites 
between October and December 2015. Interviews were also conducted with former 
UNMISS senior staff members in Norway at the start of January 2016. Throughout 
the research period (October 2015–January 2016), interviews were carried out with 
former UNMISS and humanitarian staff who are currently outside of the country.
The author attempted to interview as many interlocutors as possible, but the constraint 
of time created limitations. It must be stated clearly that humanitarians are not a 
homogenous group. Indeed, even single institutions such as UNMISS have many 
varied experiences and opinions among its staff. Few people were willing to speak 
freely on record and so most references are anonymous. Importantly, references 
to “humanitarians” or “UNMISS” are not representative of every humanitarian 
organization or every staff member, and it is expected readers might strongly disagree 
with some of the sentiments. It is hoped, though, that the opinions and experiences 
from dozens of key informants across the major stakeholders adequately embody the 
many challenges and situations. However, any misrepresentations or inaccuracies 
are the author’s alone. Many thanks are needed to all those who were willing to share 
their experiences and understandings of the issues.
Methodology
The primary aim of the paper is to provide an impartial and independent 
overview of the major PoC sites in South Sudan in order to improve 
understanding between UNMISS, UN agencies and humanitarians working in 
the PoC sites as well as the donors supporting those actors. Importantly, this 
is not a comprehensive study of every facet of the PoC sites. Over the past two 
years, various research institutes have looked into a number of PoC dynamics 
in greater depth, including the UNMISS PoC mandate, the perception of 
the PoC sites by the IDPs and rule of law. The focus of this report is on the 
practical implications of the PoC sites for the many stakeholders involved.
Objective
L. Hovil, Protecting some of the people some of the time (International Refugee Rights Initiative, 2015); L. Sharland, and A. Gorur. December 2015. Revising the UN 
Peacekeeping Mandate in South Sudan: Maintaining Focus on the Protection of Civilians. (The Stimson Center and the Australian Strategic Policy Institute, December 2015); 
F. McCrone Justice Displaced: field notes on criminality and insecurity in South Sudan’s UN Protection of Civilian Sites (working paper/unpublished) (Justice Africa, 2015).
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Since Sudan’s independence in 1956, Southern 
Sudanese have suffered from three devastating civil wars 
and widespread political and local violence.2 The third 
civil war of December 2013 broke out less than three 
years after the country gained independence from Sudan 
in July 2011 and less than nine years after the signing of 
the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in January 
2005, which ended the second civil war between the 
Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) 
and the Sudanese government (National Congress Party 
or NCP). Even in the intervening peace years, low-level 
interethnic conflicts and political insurgencies continued 
in many rural areas of South Sudan, resulting in 
thousands of deaths, abductions and loss of livelihoods. 
Political divides within the SPLM leadership prompted 
the outbreak of violence in the military barracks in Juba 
on 15 December 2013. The violence quickly escalated 
with the ethno-political targeting by government security 
forces in Juba of Nuer peoples, the ethnic group of 
the former vice president and current commander of 
the opposition, Riek Machar.3 In consequence, tens of 
thousands of civilians fled to the two UNMISS bases in 
Juba for protection, prompting the creation of the PoC 
sites. When violence reached the state capitals of Bor, 
Bentiu and Malakal, civilians, government officials, and 
even military personnel fled to the UNMISS bases in 
these capitals for protection. 
On 18 December, Riek Machar announced he was heading 
a new rebel movement, the SPLM/A-in-Opposition or 
SPLM/A-IO, against President Salva Kiir, from the Dinka 
ethnic group, and his government. On the same day, 
Peter Gadet, the SPLA 8th Division commander, defected 
and overtook a military base in Bor, the capital of Jonglei 
State. Following his capture of the town, a large number 
of Dinka civilians were forced to flee and seek refuge in 
the UNMISS base. The following day, on 19 December, 
in retaliation for the killings of Nuer civilians in Juba, 
Nuer youth attacked the UNMISS base in Akobo County, 
Jonglei, and killed at least 20 Dinka civilians and military 
personnel who had fled there for protection.4
The conflict quickly spread to other parts of the country, 
commonly starting between soldiers in the military 
barracks and along ethnic lines. On 19 December, 
violence broke out in the SPLA 4th Division headquarters 
in Rubkona in Bentiu, the capital of Unity State. By 21 
December, the Governor of Unity State, Joseph Monytuil, 
had retreated and the opposition fighters declared 
themselves in control of the city. Meanwhile, in Malakal, 
the state headquarters of Upper Nile, units loyal to 
the opposition took the city on 24 December, driving 
thousands of people, including the Governor of Upper 
Nile State, to the UNMISS camp for safety. The same 
day, the government retook Bor, and thousands of Dinka 
civilians subsequently left the PoC site. 
Background
1955 1956 1980 19831960 1963 1972 19851965 19881970 1975
•	Southern Corps of the Sudanese 
army mutinied in Torit.
•	First civil war. 
•	Sudan’s independence.  
•	Rebels came together under 
the name Anyanya.
•	Addis Ababa peace accord 
signed and Southern Regional 
Government established.
•	Mutinies by Anyanya 
veterans, culminating 
in the establishment 
of Anyanya II units in 
Ethiopia.
•	Low intensity warfare.
•	Mutinies spread, 
Southern Regional 
Government abolished, 
the Sudan People’s 
Liberation Movement/
Army (SPLM/SPLA) 
formed in Ethiopia in 
July. 
•	1983–2005  
Second civil war.
•	1983–1987 
Leadership split and 
ensuing factional 
conflict between 
Anyanya-2 and SPLA. 
Both parties carried 
out atrocities against 
civilians, including Nuer 
communities along the 
Upper Nile  / Ethiopian 
border. 
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First civil war: 1955–1972, Second civil war: 1983–2005; and the Third civil war: 2013 
– (?). Although the first civil war, according to the official discourse, began in 1955 
with the Torit Mutiny, Anyanya I did not emerge until 1963, bringing the country into 
full-scale civil war. The second civil war began in 1983 with the Bor Mutiny, however, 
the Anyanya II rebellions started several years earlier. See: D. Johnson The Root Causes 
of Sudan's Civil Wars (Oxford, James Currey, 2003). 
Human Rights Watch (HRW), South Sudan’s New War: Abuses by Government and 
Opposition Forces (2014); International Crisis Group, South Sudan: A Civil War by Any 
Other Name, Africa Report N°21 (Brussels 2014).
UNMISS Issues Preliminary Account of Akobo Base Attack, 20 December 2013.
HRW. 2014; International Crisis Group, 2014.
N. Cumming-Bruce, “U.N. Finds South Sudan Increasingly in Turmoil,” New York Times, 
21 January 2016.
“Call for immediate humanitarian action to prevent famine in South Sudan.”, IPC Alert, 
Issue 3, p. 22, October 2015, Juba.
A. Sperber, “South Sudan’s Next Civil War is Starting,” Foreign Policy online, 22 
January 2016.
2
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5
6
7
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Over the following month, the three state capitals in 
Greater Upper Nile –which comprises Unity, Upper Nile, 
and Jonglei states– changed hands multiple times as 
both warring parties struggled to consolidate their control 
of the cities. When the cities changed hands, the ethnic 
makeup of the displaced persons seeking protection 
in the UNMISS bases would also change. Individuals 
with sufficient means and/or connections went to Juba 
or neighbouring countries. The remaining IDPs had the 
choice of either staying in the PoC site or walking long 
distances to areas perceived as more stable within South 
Sudan or across international borders to neighbouring 
countries, including Ethiopia, Kenya, Sudan and Uganda.
     
Since the 2013 conflict broke out, tens of thousands of 
people have been killed. As has been the case during 
decades of warfare in South Sudan, political violence is 
primarily directed at civilians perceived to be sympathizers 
of the opposing side. Both parties to the conflict have been 
accused of carrying out gross human rights violations, 
including summary executions, abductions, torture 
and rape of civilians.5 A recent UN report accuses the 
government of having “adopted scorched-earth tactics, 
burning entire villages, killing their inhabitants, destroying 
crops and looting livestock.”6 The targeting of civilians 
has led to major displacement, forcing at least 2.3 million 
people to flee their homes. Even prior to the outbreak of 
the third civil war, large parts of the country were food 
insecure and in need of support. As of September 2015, 
a third of the population in South Sudan was encountering 
severe food insecurity.7
A peace agreement signed by both parties in August 
2015 has made intermittent progress, but continues 
to face significant setbacks. Southern Unity continues 
to be severely affected by armed violence and the 
persecution of civilians perceived to be loyal to the rebel 
forces. Meanwhile, new areas of conflict have erupted in 
historically stable parts of the country, such as Western 
Equatoria and Western Bahr el Ghazal states. The 
unilateral decision to create 28 states by President Kiir 
has been rejected by the SPLA-IO, who insists that the 
decision is interfering with the peace agreement. Analysts 
and observers fear the peace agreement could fall apart 
entirely.8 It is within this context that the stability of the 
PoC sites continues to be of great importance.
2005 2006 20112010 2013 2014199119901988 2015 201619971995 2000 2002
•	Juba declaration provides 
a path for the integration 
of former militias (SSDF) 
into SPLA. 
•	South Sudan’s 
independence. 
•	April. Riek Machar 
relieved of Vice 
Presidential duties. 
•	 July. Entire cabinet fired. 
•	Comprehensive Peace 
Agreement (CPA) signed.
•	John Garang dies in 
helicopter crash.
•	Riek Machar and John 
Garang sign the Nairobi 
Declaration on Unity and 
Integration.
•	2002–2005 Khartoum 
and SPLM discuss peace.
•	February. Third ceasefire 
signed in Addis Ababa. 
•	August. Fourth ceasefire 
signed by Machar in 
Addis Ababa and two 
weeks later by Kiir in 
Juba.  
•	October. President Kiir 
calls for establishment 
order number 36/2015 
for the creation of 28 
States.
•	December. Appointment 
of 28 new Governors.
•	February. 
Fighting breaks 
out in Malakal 
PoC followed by 
an attack on the 
site. 19 killed.
•	February.   
UN Secretary 
General, Ban 
Ki Moon, visits 
South Sudan. 
•	Merger between 
Anyanya II and 
SPLM/A.
•	Split of SPLM/A 
between Riek Machar 
and John Garang 
and ensuing factional 
warfare. Both factions 
committed grave 
atrocities against 
civilians, including in Bor 
(“Bor massacre”).
•	Khartoum Peace 
Agreement signed 
between the Sudanese 
government (NCP) 
and a number of rebel 
movements, including 
Riek Machar’s SSIM.
•	Riek Machar 
withdraws from 
Khartoum Peace 
Agreement.  
•	January. First ceasefire 
signed in Addis Ababa.  
•	April. UNMISS Bor POC 
attacked by Dinka youth.  
47 killed.  
•	May. US Secretary of 
State, John Kerry, visits 
South Sudan. Warns 
GoSS and Rebels to avert 
genocide.
•	May. UN Secretary 
General, Ban Ki Moon, 
visits South Sudan. Talks to 
leaders and urges them to 
work together.  
•	May. Second ceasefire 
signed in Addis Ababa.  
•	December. New civil 
war erupts in Juba. Nuer 
civilians killed.   
Nuer civilians retaliate for 
Juba by killing Dinka in 
UNMISS Akobo base.
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The term “PoC sites”, or protection of civilian sites, came 
into use after December 2013 to describe IDPs residing 
in UNMISS peacekeeping bases for protection, but 
precedent for this situation already existed within South 
Sudan. According to former UNMISS staff Damien Lilly, 
“between October 2012 and November 2013, more than 
12,000 civilians sought protection at UNMISS bases [in 
various parts of the country] on 12 separate occasions.”9 
While these cases were only temporary, both UNMISS 
and humanitarians had previous experience with IDPs 
seeking safety in UN military bases. Prior to the eruption of 
the recent civil war, the most frequent site employed as a 
temporary civilian protection base was the UNMISS base 
in Pibor, where civilians sought refuge six times between 
2012 and 2013 due to an armed insurgency in Jonglei 
(ibid.). Meanwhile, in Wau, the state capital of Western Bahr 
al Ghazal, as many as 5,000 civilians fled to the UNMISS 
base from 19–21 December 2012 after protesters from the 
Belanda ethnic group were shot and killed in the town (ibid.).
The humanitarian response in all these cases was either 
non-existent or extremely limited due to the rapid unfolding 
of events and an insufficient implementation timeframe. 
In Wau, high energy biscuits were distributed and basic 
sanitation provided in the form of latrines. Dealing with 
the continual inflow of IDPs in Pibor, UNMISS created a 
space adjacent to the base for civilians seeking protection. 
However, since this was outside the military perimeter of 
the UNMISS base, civilians generally did not feel protected. 
Consequently, many sought ways to leave Pibor town 
altogether and only a small group continued to go to 
UNMISS for safety.10
These experiences led to concerns and discussions 
between UNMISS and humanitarians regarding the 
preparedness of UNMISS to respond to short-term 
humanitarian needs on its bases and the willingness of 
humanitarian actors to step in and assume responsibility 
for providing the basic needs of these IDPs. Following the 
Wau incident, UNMISS released guidelines on 30 April 
2013 for “Civilians seeking protection at UNMISS bases” 
after months of discussions with humanitarian actors.11 
The guidelines stated that UNMISS would provide for basic 
needs for a limited amount of time, “preferably not more 
than 72 hours,” whereupon humanitarian actors would then 
take over the responsibility of humanitarian needs (ibid., 
p. 6). The guidelines also recommended that all UNMISS 
bases should develop contingency plans identifying an 
area where civilians could be received and provided with 
physical security, procedures for arriving civilians and the 
“identification of potential minimal relief assistance” (ibid., 
p. 6). Importantly, the contingency plans were expected to 
include “proposals for an alternative longer-term solution 
for protecting the civilians away from the UNMISS bases, 
in the event that a crisis persists for more than a few days” 
(ibid., p. 6).
History of Civilians Fleeing to UNMISS Bases
2013 2014
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1. Conflict erupts in Juba.  
10,000 killed. War spreads 
quickly throughout South 
Sudan.
2. 30,000 IDPs enter UN PoCs1 
in Juba.   
   
 
3. IDPs flee to UN bases  
Bor: 20,000   
Malakal: 26,000    
Bentiu: 8,000
4. April 2014: Heavy fighting in 
Unity State, including Bentiu. 
IDP population at Bentiu PoC 
increases to 43,000 by June.
5. June 2014–January 2015:  
IDP population at UN bases 
remains consistent, around 
95,000 to 105,000
6. July 2014:   
UN declares South Sudan 
worst food security situation in 
the world.
7. 6 August 2014:   
Aid workers killed in Maban.
8. December 2014:   
1.4 million IDPs across South 
Sudan 488,300 have fled to 
neighbouring countries.  
   
 
Timeline: IDPs in South Sudan
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
17Lessons Learned from South Sudan Protection of Civilian Sites -
The Humanitarian Country Team (HCT)12 and UNMISS 
jointly developed “Guidelines for the Coordination between 
Humanitarian Actors and the United Nations Mission in 
South Sudan,” endorsed by the HCT on 6 December 
2013, only nine days prior to the outbreak of the conflict in 
Juba. This document indicates that “strategic coordination 
between the humanitarian community and UNMISS 
should be assured by the existence of a triple-hatted 
DSRSG/RC/HC,”13 and that “humanitarians actors are not 
tasked by UNMISS, and vice versa” (ibid., pp. 3–4). The 
guidelines also acknowledge that “coordination between 
humanitarian actors and UNMISS on protection of civilians 
(PoC) issues is essential to assure the timely two-way 
information exchange and early warning, consultative 
analysis, prioritization of geographical and thematic issues, 
and distinction of activities, taking into account different 
organisational approaches and mandates” (ibid., p. 6).
Despite these guidelines, no one was prepared for the 
events of December 2013. Some staff were unaware of 
the existing UNMISS guidelines, while others felt that they 
only addressed the initial 72 hours and, therefore, were not 
applicable once that deadline passed. Many of the tensions 
surrounding the PoC sites that would arise were alluded to in 
the UNMISS guidelines, even if further guidance was needed. 
In many areas, the theory did not translate to practice. The 
contingency plans required for each UNMISS base either 
did not exist or were not applied when IDPs arrived at some 
bases, such as Malakal (Interview 50). Moreover, existing 
plans had not calculated for the arrival of more than 500 
IDPs and were put to serious test when tens of thousands of 
people arrived at many of the UNMISS bases. 
No bases seemed to have existing proposals for alternatives 
solutions if the crisis lasted longer than three days. Only 
seven days before fighting broke out the HCT had endorsed 
guidelines stating “In the first instance, humanitarian work 
should be performed by humanitarian organizations. Insofar 
as military organizations have a role to play in supporting 
humanitarian work, it should be primarily focused on 
helping to create a safe and secure environment to enable 
humanitarian action and the protection of civilians.”14
The crisis prompted many humanitarian agencies to 
evacuate staff, leaving UNMISS largely responsible for 
humanitarian needs in many locations. How can this 
diffusion of responsibility be explained? The next section 
examines the immediate reaction among the international 
community upon the outbreak of violence in Juba and how 
the crisis led to the situation of a military, not humanitarian, 
actor distributing food to IDPs.
2015
Dec FebJan AprMar JunMay AugJul OctSep DecNov
9. 2.5 million are severely food 
insecure.
10. 18 April 2015:   
Humanitarian assistance in 
parts of Upper Nile State 
suspended due to killing of 
WFP staff.
11. May–September 2015:  
Intense fighting parts of Unity 
& Upper Nile. Aid halted in 
some areas.
12. July–September 2015:  
Malakal IDP population 
increases from 30,400 to 45,500
13. 3.9 million are severely food 
insecure. 30,000 in Unity 
facing catastrophe level food 
insecurity (IPC 5) 
14. October 2015:   
Fighting resumes in central 
& southern Unity Conflict in 
Western Equatoria prompts 
displacement, disrupts aid.
15. December 2015:  
1.66 million IDPs   
208,500 IDPs at UN PoCsites 
646,000 refugees in 
neighbouring countries.
D. Lilly, “Protection of civilian sites: a new type of displacement settlement?” 
Humanitarian Exchange No. 62, pp. 31–33 (9 September 2014).
Interview with civilians in Pibor, 2013.
United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS). Guidelines: Civilians seeking 
protection at UNMISS bases. Approved by Ms Hilde Johnson, Special Representative of 
the Secretary-General (SRSG). Review date: 30 April 2013. Effective date: 30 April 2013.
A consultative and decision-making humanitarian body, comprising of UN agencies, 
NGOs, and other humanitarian stakeholders in South Sudan.
The triple hat, or three different roles in one, are the Deputy Special Representative of 
the Secretary General, Resident Coordinator, and Humanitarian Coordinator.
UN Humanitarian Country Team, “Guidelines for the Coordination between Humanitarian Actors 
and the United Nations Mission in South Sudan”. 9 December 2013 (Juba, UNHCT, 2013).
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“I left fire and I am being pushed back into the fire”. Many IDPs endured atrocities before finding refuge in the site. © IOM 2015 Photo: Brendan Bannon
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Evacuation
The crisis began on 15 December 2013, and it could not have 
happened at a worse time of the calendar year in terms of the 
capability of both UNMISS and the humanitarian community 
to respond. Historically, the second half of December in 
South Sudan is quiet due to the holiday season, meaning that 
UN agencies, INGOs and UNMISS were all functioning on 
reduced staffing levels when the crisis occurred (Interviews 
54, 91). The intensity of the conflict within Juba itself prompted 
most INGOs and UN agencies to evacuate all non-essential 
international staff when the airport opened on 18 December. 
Many organizations working in South Sudan were development 
based and did not have the capacity or security protocols in 
place to respond to a quick-onset emergency, while, at the 
same time, many established relief agencies were completely 
unprepared (Interview 91). While tens of thousands of IDPs 
were fleeing to UNMISS bases for protection, humanitarians 
were evacuating staff, and it took months for humanitarian 
agencies to become fully operational again. The evacuation left 
a negative impact on the capacity of the emergency response. 
Opening the Gates
Many respondents who were involved in the immediate 
response described the first few weeks of the crisis as chaotic. 
On 16 December, IDPs were rushing to the UNMISS base in 
Juba’s Tongping neighbourhood, and, rather than let the gates 
be broken, soldiers opened the gates even before the order 
from former Special Representative of the Secretary-General 
(SRSG) Hilde Johnson was released (Interview 85). In an 
interview with the author, the the Deputy Special Representative 
of the Secretary-General / Resident Coordinator / Humanitarian 
Coordinator (DSRSG/RC/HC) at the time, Toby Lanzer, stated 
“first of all, there was no alternative in at least two ways. We 
never “opened the gates,” it was an attitude that if there are 
people under threat, under stress, jumping over the fence, which 
was what the vast majority were doing, we will welcome them 
and we will protect them. So opening the gates was an attitude 
that we would assume our responsibilities to protect civilians.” (5 
January 2016).  After the gates opened, thousands of IDPs were 
living in the PoC site, with little control or organization and hugely 
outnumbering UNMISS staff members. Mission leadership was 
particularly concerned about the security of their staff. In some 
locations, the large numbers of IDPs paralysed the leadership 
and IDPs were sleeping anywhere they could (Interviews 42, 50).
UNMISS should be commended for the response and risks many 
staff took. As stated in a briefing by the UN Secretary-General on 
South Sudan in May 2015, “The United Nations policy of opening 
our gates as an emergency option to protect innocent civilians 
is correct, unprecedented and not without considerable risk - to 
United Nations staff, to our relations with communities and to 
those we are trying to shelter […] I am proud of the actions of 
our United Nations peacekeepers and civilian staff. Their quick 
response and courage has saved tens of thousands of lives."15
While UNMISS was overwhelmed by the influx, the mission 
expected that the conflict would have a short duration. Former 
SRSG Johnson explained that, at the time, “we weren’t thinking 
five days, but maybe a week, maybe two, maybe three weeks was 
the assessment we had because that was the situation we were 
in” (15 January 2016).  UNMISS staff explained that contingency 
plans in place for this type of scenario were calculated for 500 
IDPs, not over 10,000 (Interviews 17, 54).  Both SRSG Johnson 
and DSRSG/RC/HC Lanzer, in separate interviews, explained 
that after reports of the violence within Juba began to come in, 
they knew that the crisis would not be settled very quickly.
Overextended and unprepared, UNMISS started with the 
immediate need to organize the IDPs, provide services and 
reduce the risk of diseases and/or insecurity in locations 
completely overwhelmed by the large number of arrivals. 
According to former SRSG Johnson, “the decision was made 
by security to select areas in the bases and try to fence them 
so that we could protect UN staff and assets” (15 January 
2015). After finding a place, i.e. the PoC site, to put the 
IDPs, the immediate needs of tens of thousands of civilians 
became the priority. The decision to “open the gates” saved 
the lives of thousands in late December 2013 and was clearly 
made as a humanitarian gesture in unstable times.
Response
Humanitarian surge teams were dispatched by a few organiza-
tions with the capacity to do so, but according to former DSRSG/
RC/HC Lanzer, “the speed and the scale of what happened far 
exceeded the ability of [an NGO or] a group of NGOs and a group 
of UN agencies to handle the situation” (5 January 2016). In the 
state capitals of Bor, Bentiu and Malakal, almost all humani-
tarian staff were evacuated and UNMISS reduced civilian staff 
numbers in order to reduce security risks. This left only a few 
staff to respond to the massive influx of people in many parts 
of the country. Pre-positioned humanitarian supplies were looted 
around the country and millions of dollars in medicines, food and 
school supplies were lost, along with months of planning (Inter-
views 91, 93). When the needs were increasing the capacity of 
those on the ground was being reduced as a security measure.
The response varied greatly at each PoC site, depending on 
number and quality of staffing and the number of IDP arrivals. 
Although Bentiu eventually became the largest of the PoC sites, 
it initially hosted only a small number of IDPs, who were placed 
in an area cordoned-off from the rest of the base. UNMISS in 
Malakal were quickly overwhelmed and IDPs initially settled 
wherever they could find space and were not separated from 
UNMISS staff or assets. In the initial aftermath of the crisis, 
almost all of the humanitarian capacity was located in Juba. 
Access to PoC sites was largely limited to UNMISS helicopter 
transport as airports were contested by the warring parties. As 
the conflict spread to other locations within the next couple of 
weeks, the intensity of the violence in the state capitals paralysed 
the capacity of any major humanitarian response.
Beginning of the Crisis
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Going to the clinic to get it checked is pointless 
She will have to go out to collect firewood the next day 
and there is no time for it to heal.
Security teams search firewood for firearms. Women must leave the site daily to gather firewood to use for cooking. © IOM 2015 Photos: Brendan Bannon
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Luaa’s husband was killed in an attack on Malakal near 
the beginning of the conflict.  After the attack, her family 
fled to the church in Malakal town and stayed there for 
a month, hoping the situation would improve. When a 
new attack was imminent, church leaders told the people 
that they should move to the UNMISS base as they could 
not guarantee their safety. Most of the people, including 
Luaa, went to the base, but she had to leave her disabled 
sister Eliza behind.  
When fighters for SPLA-IO took over Malakal in March 
2014, they came to the church and demanded money for 
those staying there to be escorted to the UNMISS base. 
People paid the money, but after they came out of the 
church they were killed.  Fewer than 30 people, mostly old 
and disabled, were left alive, including Eliza. One healthy 
man was left alive to take care of them. After three days, 
UNMISS peacekeepers came to the church and took 
them to the PoC site. The sisters now live in the PoC site 
with eight children to take care of betweem them. 
In addition to the relief support they receive, their primary 
income comes from selling firewood and local brooms for 
2 SSP each. The day before the interview, Luaa spent six 
hours collecting firewood and cut open her foot. She says 
going to the clinic to get it checked is pointless since she 
will have to go out to collect firewood the next day and 
there is no time for it to heal. To reduce the risk of rape 
or abduction, the women travel in groups of 20 or more 
as they fear being found in small groups. If they travel to 
Malakal town, they are at the most risk, even if they are in 
a group. They fear that if a couple soldiers find them they 
will be forced to lie down and one of them will be taken 
away to be raped. She has heard stories of this from other 
women in the camp, as well as friends she knows. 
Luaa and  Eliza hope to return to Malakal town after 
there is peace as that is where Luaa’s children were born 
and so where her home is. They would like to continue to 
do work like they did before the conflict when they sold 
sand that they had cleared and dried as part of an NGO 
income-generating project.
Luua and Eliza
Malakal PoC Site
30–40 years old, Nuer
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As UNMISS staff in Bentiu watched the events unfolding in other locations 
in December 2013, they advocated to pre-position food and supplies 
in their base in the event of conflict — a request denied at the time as 
humanitarians did not want to risk being associated with a military actor 
(Interview 56). When the fighting broke out in nearby Rubkona on 19 
December, IDPs began to arrive and were searched and registered at 
the gates. Fortunately, UNMISS Bentiu had a plot of land that they had 
already flattened for their own purposes, and UNMISS turned it into a 
PoC site. Razor wire was put around the site and the Mongolian Battalion 
brought water tanks to the location. Foreign nationals in Bentiu had 
been told to go to the United Nations World Food Programme (WFP) 
compound in town when fighting broke out in Rubkona, so UNMISS 
collected them and brought them to the base. The foreign nationals were 
placed in a warehouse area separate from the South Sudanese IDPs.
When looting of the food warehouses in town began, UNMISS rescued 
approximately 800 metric tonnes of food commodities from the WFP 
warehouse in Bentiu town (ibid.). Latrines were built as a temporary 
measure. The low capacity of the humanitarians in country and the 
expanding conflict and needs elsewhere meant that the first humanitarian 
assessment in Bentiu came almost 20 days after the influx of IDPs to 
the base, UNMISS staff claim it was not until March that humanitarian 
agencies fully took over the response (ibid.). At the start, UNMISS 
and five UN agency staff members, who had not been evacuated, 
coordinated the humanitarian response alone.
Bentiu PoC site satellite view, February 2015 / Population: 52,500+ IDPs.
Bentiu PoC site satellite view, April 2015 / Population: 74,600+ IDPs.
Bentiu PoC site satellite view, August 2015 / Population: 103,000+ IDPs.
Unity
Case Study of Bentiu PoC Site
- Beginning of the Crisis
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Timeline: Bentiu PoC Site Population Trend
Aerial view of Bentiu PoC site, February 2016. © IOM 2016 Photo: Muse Mohammed
1. PoC site population spikes from 
7,000 to 40,000 in the month 
following a brutal Opposition 
offensive on 15 April marked 
by wide-spread human rights 
violations. In revenge, on 17 April, 
‘Dinka youth’ attack the UNMISS 
Bor PoC site, killing 48 IDPs.
2. IDPs endure terrible living 
conditions throughout the April to 
October rainy season. Population 
of Bentiu PoC site remains stable 
from April 2014 to April 2015.
3. IOM begins massive renovation 
and expansion of PoC site on 24 
January. Works largely completed 
by August.   
   
 
4. From April to December, 
humanitarian assistance to central 
Unity State largely stopped due 
to heavy fighting. Bentiu PoC site 
population climbs from 76,000 
to 130,000, with many under-5s 
arriving with severe malnutrition. 
Unprecedented malaria tops 
morbidity and mortality statistics.
5. On 29 May, an HCT monitoring 
trip was forced to evacuate 
immediately after arrival at Leer 
airport as government troops took 
back the town. The HCT witnessed 
grave human rights violations.
6. Relief agencies launch “survival 
kits” operation as SPLA offensive 
forces IDPs into remote areas 
without assistance.
7. October UN report states 
40,000 people could be facing 
catastrophic food insecurity in 
southern Unity State. After further 
assessment/data collection, 
December UN report states 
‘greater than double’ emergency 
level nutrition statistics, with 
under-5s at greatest risk. 
Mortality data not available, but 
famine declaration is inevitable 
if food/nutrition is not delivered 
immediately.
8. On 3 November UNMISS set-up 
a Temporary Operating Base 
in Leer Town. One month later, 
humanitarian partners start 
coming back to Leer County.
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Coordination
Issues of “humanitarian space” immediately arose as the 
traditional distinction between military and humanitarian 
identities became blurred. Relief agencies were reluctant to 
be associated with armed actors by providing humanitarian 
assistance on a military compound. Despite reservations, 
the dire needs of the IDPs compelled humanitarian 
organizations to be flexible and offer services. Within weeks, 
INGOs were providing services in UNMISS bases—a notion 
anathema to the identity of organizations like Médecins Sans 
Frontières (MSF) and the International Committee of the 
Red Cross (ICRC) that strictly guard their independence and 
neutrality, especially in conflict environments. The majority 
of UNMISS staff had no humanitarian experience, and the 
initial coordination was at times antagonistic, according to 
both UNMISS and humanitarian staff (Interviews 5, 50, 69, 
89, 91).
UNMISS was overwhelmed by the large number of people 
living in their bases and anticipated that better alternatives 
would be found to enable the IDPs to leave. Humanitarians 
were, as per their mandate, establishing services in the 
sites. In contrast, many in UNMISS believed hosting IDPs 
in their bases was directly infringing on the mission’s ability 
to carry out its mandate outside the PoC sites. These 
opposing perceptions would continue to define UNMISS–
humanitarian relations, but in the first few months the 
overwhelming and acute needs pushed many of these initial 
concerns to the side as both the mission and humanitarians 
focused on the response.
The main tension appeared between UNMISS and the 
humanitarians over control and responsibilities. International 
Sphere16 standards were largely disregarded due to either 
the lack of space or ignorance of humanitarian standards by 
UNMISS actors (Interviews 11, 21). Final decision-making on 
the bases rested with UNMISS leadership, which ultimately 
felt legally responsible for activities on its bases. UNMISS 
made decisions even for humanitarian activities, with which 
they had little-to-no experience. According to several 
humanitarian workers interviewed by the author, there 
was a perceived underlying threat that failure to comply 
with the mission leadership could result in their removal 
from the base (Interviews 79, 89). Attempts to centralize 
the coordination via the UN Office for the Coordination 
of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) and the UNMISS Relief, 
Reintegration and Protection (RRP) section led to additional 
layers of approvals, and decisions frequently depended on 
personal relationships to bypass the process and speed up 
procedures (Interviews 50, 89, 99). 
According to perspectives of humanitarian actors, the 
hierarchical military structure and bureaucratic systems of 
UNMISS hindered timely decision-making on humanitarian 
issues. One former camp manager claimed the extensive 
levels of approvals within the mission were “driving them 
crazy” (Interview 47). To hasten the processes, humanitar-
ians circumvented official channels. RRP, the official section 
of UNMISS responsible for coordination with humanitarians, 
was left frustrated as it had no ability to ensure that correct 
procedures had been followed and was unable to follow up. 
UNMISS would also work directly with NGOs rather than 
through the humanitarian-led camp management, and both 
RRP and camp managers felt they were being undermined 
(Interview 79). There was a lack of understanding among 
most individuals about how the “other” system functioned, 
which inevitably increasing frustrations and inefficiency.
According to many respondents, decisions from UNMISS 
were often muddled, slow, required high-level approval or 
even demanded permission from various troop contributing 
country (TCC) capitals. According to the triple-hatted 
DSRSG/RC/HC Lanzer regarding the connection between 
the military and humanitarians, “my biggest frustration, 
perhaps, was that there really is such a horizontal situation 
in the following way. you’ve got a lot of different institutions, 
each which is arguably as equal as the other, and there is 
very difficult command and control in an environment where 
actually police officers or even civilian peacekeeping staff 
would be expecting command and control. For example, we 
could not tell an NGO you have to go do this, and an NGO 
could not tell a police officer, you have to go do this” (5 
January 2016).
Those interviewed expressed a widespread consensus that, 
as the focal point for coordination between the stakeholders, 
Lanzer’s role and his leadership were vital to the response 
(Interviews 5, 10, 32, 48, 49, 50). The overwhelming 
needs and the completely new experience of organizing a 
humanitarian response within a military framework meant 
that even small decisions often demanded his involvement. 
The triple hat also left him in a difficult position when 
agendas between the military and humanitarians clashed. 
The amount of work resulted in a call for a new position of 
Deputy Humanitarian Coordinator (DHC), which became a 
full-time position more than a year into the crisis. According 
to Lanzer, the UNMISS section of RRP, working under his 
office of the DSRSG/RC/HC, became paramount in the 
response as the mediator between the humanitarians and 
the mission.17 Current DSRSG/RC/HC Eugene Owusu 
explained that having the triple role leads to opportunities 
to finding collective solutions through the leveraging of 
resources (23 February 2016). The position has been 
extremely relevant in the context of the PoC sites and vital 
to solving issues between the many stakeholders.
The Sphere Project was launched in 1997 by humanitarian stakeholders to improve the 
quality of assistance provided to disaster-affected persons and to enhance the accountability 
of humanitarian agencies. The standards provide clear indicators for establishing and 
managing IDP sites.
The UNMISS section of RRP has changed its role and title a number of times throughout 
the years. According to staff initially it was Returns, Recovery and Reintegration (RRR), 
then RRP and finally Reintegration, Recovery and Peacebuilding, before finally taking on its 
current title in July 2014.
16 17
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Clusters are groups of humanitarian organizations, both UN and non-UN, in each of the main 
sectors of humanitarian action, e.g. water, health and logistics. They are designated by the 
Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) and have clear responsibilities for coordination.
Office of the Deputy Humanitarian Coordinator for South Sudan, Crisis Impacts on 
Households in Unity State, South Sudan, 2014–2015. Initial Results of a Survey. (Juba, 
OCHA, January 2016).
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Frustrations 
A major challenge expressed by many humanitarians 
during interviews was the perception that they were 
regarded as purely advisors by some in the mission and 
technical decisions were often overruled by those with little 
humanitarian experience, further delaying the response 
(Interviews 7, 91). In one frequently quoted example, a 
decision made by the Water, Sanitation and Hygiene (WASH) 
Cluster18 coordinator and the head of RRP about where to 
build latrines in the Tongping PoC site was refused by the 
Rwandan Battalion commander, reportedly after direction 
from the Rwandan government in Kigali (Interviews 2, 50, 91). 
According to some humanitarians, it was often easier to work 
directly with UN Police (UNPOL) or with the military side of 
UNMISS than with the civilian sections of UNMISS. This 
was because the former often had a better understanding 
of the PoC sites and their limitations since they were also 
frequently working in the camps (Interview 14). Despite the 
above statement by former DSRSG/RC/HC Lanzer regarding 
the lack of control by both groups, humanitarians often 
complained that civilian sections of UNMISS would attempt 
to task them, which further exacerbated frustrations. 
According to former camp managers, while humanitarian 
organizations with significant influence were able to push 
back against what they perceived to be bullying tactics by 
UNMISS, many of the smaller organizations were unable to 
stand up against the mission leadership (Interviews 11, 47, 79). 
From the perspective of UNMISS and humanitarian 
coordinators, the high turnover of humanitarian staff 
reduced institutional knowledge of processes and systems, 
which in turn slowed down decision-making. RRP expressed 
frustration over the need to repeat the same information to 
new humanitarian staff, some with very little experience and 
security preparation, arriving in field locations experiencing 
heavy fighting (Interviews 17, 30, 32). One former cluster 
coordinator remembers feeling a sense of dread whenever 
experienced staff left the country. Institutional knowledge 
of the context and processes were very low and highly 
dependent upon a few competent individuals (Interview 
91). When new challenges arose, flexibility was a necessity 
and concessions had to be made; but, inexperienced 
humanitarian staff were afraid to take responsibility for not 
“going by the book,” paralysing decision-making. 
In the first few months, many NGOs relied heavily on 
UNMISS facilities and equipment, which created a feeling of 
resentment among many in the mission (Interview 32). While 
Juba-based staff demanded more humanitarian space, 
many humanitarians at the field level held an expectation 
of support from the mission (Interviews 17, 30). RRP staff 
pointed out that both humanitarians and UNMISS were 
quick to assign blame to each other rather than work to 
find solutions (Interview 17). When frustrated with decisions 
from Juba, humanitarians would complain to their superiors 
in Juba, making working together even more difficult in the 
future (ibid.). Not surprisingly, this exacerbated frustrations 
between the field and Juba, as well as between humanitar-
ians and the mission. 
Both key humanitarians and UNMISS respondents also 
believed identifying priorities was a challenge for both 
groups and they would often try and do everything or fall 
back on the simplest option (Interviews 91, 95). Interestingly, 
a number of people, including humanitarians and 
representatives from UNMISS, believed the coordination 
was actually at its best and least antagonistic when the 
needs were highest. At the very beginning of the crisis in 
December 2013 and during major events in the camps, 
such as the inter-ethnic tensions in Malakal in November 
2014 and May 2015, coordination was better (Interview 11, 
95). Hence, crisis situations made priorities both clearer 
and ensured they were shared between humanitarians and 
UNMISS, as well as among UNMISS sections. 
When the initial emergency was under control and mortality 
rates decreased in the PoC sites, the relationship between 
UNMISS and humanitarians became more challenging. By 
mid-2014, Juba had been calm for months and parts of 
the mission were worried that the continued provision of 
services would create a pull factor to the PoC sites, reducing 
the willingness of IDPs to return home. Some services, such 
as higher education activities and child friendly spaces, 
were perceived as non-essential and were thus refused 
by the mission. Humanitarians and UNMISS were at odds, 
particularly in Juba, over the PoC sites and the potential 
threats faced by the IDPs if the PoC sites closed. As some 
IDPs would leave the camps during the day, UNMISS believed 
their primary reason for staying in the camp was to obtain 
access to services, not for security reasons (Interview 47). 
UNMISS was not initially supportive of the massive 
extension of Bentiu PoC site, implemented in early 2015, as 
they believed that expansion would create a bigger draw for 
services. However, protection, not services, proved to be 
the primary draw factor as the site quickly filled with tens of 
thousands of new arrivals in 2015 as the brutal dry season 
offensive in Unity forced civilians from their homes. A recent 
report by the Office of the Deputy Humanitarian Coordinator 
found that civilians in southern Unity who sent some family 
members to the PoC sites had experienced three times as 
many shocks as those who had not.19 Eighty-six per cent of 
those surveyed had experienced at least one major shock 
in 2015 alone (ibid.). A common perception among many in 
the mission was that the existence of the PoC site directly 
hindered the mission’s ability to carry out its new protection 
of civilian mandate to enhance protection outside the PoC 
sites (Interviews 50, 88, 96). 
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The continued provision of services and improved conditions 
ensured that IDPs would stay and could draw even more 
IDPs to the PoC sites. Consequently, the objectives of the 
humanitarians and the mission were directly opposed. The 
current debate over PoC sites centres around the mandate: 
are PoC sites an example of UNMISS successfully carrying 
out its mandate or is their existence a hindrance to UNMISS 
doing so? The tensions that exist between stakeholders will 
be examined in a later section.
Resources and Responsibilities 
The assumption that the UNMISS bases were only a 
short-term protection measure for civilians fleeing the 
conflict created an initial situation in which there was no 
clear delineation of responsibilities between the actors 
responding in the PoC sites. Only when it became apparent 
that the PoC sites would be more long-term and require 
continuous funding did the issue of responsibilities and 
funding come to the forefront. 
The intricacies of UN peacekeeping financing contributed to 
the tensions over budgets and responsibilities. According to a 
staff member in UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations 
(DPKO) New york, peacekeeping budgets are calculated a 
year in advance. When the crisis broke out in December 2013, 
the budget in use had been calculated in 2012 (Interview 96). 
The Department of Mission Support (DMS) can only shift 
funds within one of the three categories of expenditure—
civilian personnel, military and police personnel and operation 
costs—without approval from New york, leaving little room 
for flexibility (ibid.). As a result of these budgetary restrictions, 
UNMISS resources spent on the PoC sites had to be derived 
from money freed from other budgeted mission activities that 
were no longer viable due to the conflict.
In July 2014, after the initial six months of response, DMS 
announced that expenses for the PoC sites had cost the 
mission an estimated USD 50 million and that “UNMISS 
resources for PoC construction and maintenance will no 
longer be available.”20 DMS further stated that there was 
an “unrealistic expectation from humanitarians and donor 
partners that UNMISS be responsible for long term PoC site 
construction and maintenance, defaulting to UNMISS for 
support when their own mechanisms fail” (ibid.). In order to 
formally resolve these types of issues, the first national PoC 
site meeting began on 16 September 2014.21
The widespread assumption that UNMISS was responsible 
for construction and maintenance grew from the dynamics 
during the early stages of the conflict, when UNMISS was 
the only institution with the required resources and assets. 
The hope that the PoC sites were short-term meant that 
obtaining immediate funding for major construction projects 
in the camps was not an initial option, and the priority for 
humanitarian organizations was instead concentrated 
on meeting immediate life-saving needs. With the rainy 
season quickly approaching in May 2014, the window of 
opportunity to shift equipment to PoC sites in the field was 
limited, and the only stakeholder with heavy equipment in 
the concerned locations was the mission itself.
In Juba, the mission leadership worked with the Chinese 
government and Chinese community in Juba to develop 
the initial land works for a new PoC site near UN House, 
but this was not an option for the other locations (Interview 
93). In May 2014, Security Council Resolution 2155 provided 
for changes to the UNMISS mandate, redirecting its state-
building activities to focus entirely on protection of civilians, 
potentially freeing budget lines in state-building activities.22
Typically, when a mandate is renewed and altered, DPKO 
missions request additional or new funding. Despite 
the reinforcement of its protection of civilians mandate, 
according to one DPKO Ny staff member in New york 
UNMISS did not put in any requests for extra financial 
support for the PoC sites. This staff believes the reason 
was that “this is in some ways a reflection of the belief that 
maintaining PoC sites is not a core activity for peacekeeping, 
[but] it's also because the U.S. and other major financial 
contributors would not have accepted such activities to be 
funded from peacekeeping budgets” (Interview 96). This 
explanation was also supported by a former member of RRP 
who had tried, unsuccessfully, to shift the UNMISS planning 
cycle in order to create a two-year plan for the PoC sites 
(Interview 50). The former staff also stated that there was no 
long-term planning as this required acceptance of the PoC 
sites as longer-term measures, which was anathema to the 
mission leadership and DPKO headquarters (Interview 50). 
Ironically, while both UNMISS and humanitarians debate 
over divisions of responsibilities for the PoC sites, the 
funding for both largely derives from the same donors. 
The major donors for DPKO are also the largest funders 
of humanitarian agencies in South Sudan. As different 
departments and agencies within these governments are 
responsible for funding different UN organizations, there 
is limited coordination and no common funding channels 
in place to meet the needs of the PoC sites (Interview 96). 
Challenges in coordinated funding occur not just between 
donors but also between the departments internally within 
donor governments. While foreign ministries focus on 
humanitarian and development programming within the UN 
system, it is often representatives of the finance ministries that 
are involved in decisions for funding and budgets for The Fifth 
Committee (ibid.).23 If the major financial backers were able to 
coordinate between and within their own governments, many 
of the issues regarding funding of the PoC sites could have 
been resolved (ibid.). According to a high-ranking UNMISS 
staff member, with the global economic recession and a 
simultaneous increase in DPKO missions, reduced funding for 
missions is likely to be a trend in the years to come (Interview 
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50). Therefore, the discussion should focus on what can be 
done with fewer resources, including fewer bases, fewer 
troops with better training and greater coordination and better 
prioritization by the leadership (Interview 95).
Guidelines for Roles and Responsibilities
Following months of extensive coordination between 
humanitarians and UNMISS, guidelines for defining the 
various roles of responsibility in the PoC sites were approved 
on 19 September 2014. While the guidelines resolved much 
of the debate, some key issues were still left unclear. For 
example, some members of the Mission Support Unit in the 
PoC sites in state capitals claimed they were not informed 
of the guidelines by the mission and instead received the 
information from humanitarian agencies on the ground 
(Interview 21). There were also uncertainties within the mission 
whether the leadership had signed off on the guidelines and if 
they should be followed or not (Interview 17).
Despite clearly defined responsibilities, some humanitarian 
actors continue to rely on UNMISS when they require 
heavy equipment or do not have the capacity to fulfil 
their responsibilities, such as dead body management in 
the PoC sites. Former DSRSG/RC/HC Lanzer, as well as 
other UNMISS staff, acknowledged that the stakeholders 
responsible for the perimeters of the PoC sites were still 
not clearly defined. According to the agreed guidelines, 
the construction of physical security infrastructure falls to 
Mission Support, however it is “subject to availability of 
heavy engineering equipment and resources.”24 This was 
repeated by a member of Mission Support who stated that 
“if these [money and resources] are not available, what can 
we do?” (Interview 21). Even though the responsibilities 
have become clearer, the issue of limited funding still exists 
and some parties do not follow the guidelines (Interview 
11). Importantly, even before the creation of the PoC sites, 
the common refrain was that UNMISS did not have enough 
resources, in terms of cash or forces, to properly carry 
out its protection of civilians mandate outside the bases.
An UNMISS soldier walks the berm of the Bentiu PoC site as part of his regular patrol. © IOM 2016 Photo: Muse Mohammed
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When the guards at the gate saw that 
people were going to force the gates open 
they decided to open them and let them in.
Flooding and confined living conditions in the Tongping PoC site in Juba. © IOM 2014 Photos: Martin Legasse
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When fighting broke out in Juba on 15 December 2013, 
Nyalkume fled to the UNMISS Tongping base. Her 
family arrived at the western gate, but it was closed and 
people were fearful. Some IDPs were sneaking into the 
camp while others began to push on the gates to open 
them by force. When the guards at the gate saw that 
people were going to force the gates open they decided 
to open them and let them in. From the gate UNMISS 
moved IDPs by bus to the Rwandan Battalion area 
where they were given cooking utensils and water and 
children were given biscuits. They settled there and 
stayed until the rains came and the area was flooded. 
Then they were transferred to the Japanese Battalion 
area. Soon this area became flooded as well, and when 
Nyalkume heard that people were being relocated 
from Tongping to Jebel (location of UN House and 
PoC site 3) they volunteered to go and were part of 
the first group of IDPs relocated in June 2014. Life in 
UN House was much better, but as new arrivals kept 
coming without being registered, they have to share 
the water and food with them. When the Transitional 
Government of National Unity is formed, she plans 
to look for her parents in Leer, where she is originally 
from. She has not heard from her family in Leer since 
the conflict began two years ago and is worried about 
them. She hopes an organization can help her find 
them and reconnect when there is peace.
Nyalkume
They settled there and stayed 
until the rains came and the area was 
flooded. Then they were transferred to the 
Japanese Batallion area. Soon this area 
became flooded as well ...
Juba UN House PoC Site
20-30 years old, Nuer woman
Violence and displacement continued throughout 2015. A woman arrives with a handful of possesions to the Bentiu PoC in August. © IOM 2015 Photo: Brendan Bannon
31
UNMISS and the PoC Sites
Mandate 
Many in UNMISS perceive the PoC sites as constricting the 
mission’s ability to carry out its protection of civilian mandate, 
and, therefore, should be closed as soon as possible. Others 
in the mission believe that the creation of the PoC sites is 
a significant, and arguably the most successful, example 
of UNMISS’s implementation of its protection of civilians 
mandate (Interview 50). 
Former DSRSG/RC/HC Lanzer argued that
“UNMISS looking after people on its bases is, if 
you will, protection of civilians in action. It’s a very 
visible, very tangible expression of a peacekeeping 
mission fulfilling its security council mandate, and 
UNMISS should be proud of it, not trying to state 
that this was detracting from its ability to do other 
things, for example patrol in other parts of the 
country”, 5 January 2015. 
Not everyone in the mission agrees, and many respondents 
regarded the PoC sites as obstacles to a broader operational 
implementation of protection of civilians in South Sudan. 
Tensions within UNMISS over the perception of the PoC 
sites as either a success or a hindrance remain central to 
the relationship those in the mission have with the sites. 
These perceptions also have important implications for 
the operation and funding of the PoC sites. If the sites 
are perceived to be a successful example of UNMISS 
carrying out its mandate, then there is more interest to 
invest in them and less pressure from mission leadership 
and New york to close them down. One former UNMISS 
staff member noted that there is an “irreconcilable tension: 
on the one hand it [PoC sites] is central to what we are 
doing, but we never want to say that because that would 
somehow be admitting that our other peacekeeping 
strategies are failures” (Interview 50). The same staff 
member further pointed out that instead of regarding the 
PoC sites as obstacles to carrying out the protection of 
civilians mandate, “it is quite demonstrable that the inverse 
is true. PoC sites are a consequence of the mission’s 
inability to do protection of civilians in any other locations 
outside of these core bases” (Interview 50). According to 
UNMISS leadership, the mission could not have protected 
civilians outside its bases with the resources at its disposal. 
Making references to the lack of troops and the intensity 
of the violence, former SRSG Johnson rejected the notion 
that the mission had the capacity to prevent the violence 
in Juba (15 January 2016).25 The important question of the 
feasibility of the mandate given to the mission by Member 
States must be raised. 
Since their formation, the PoC sites have frequently been 
blamed for demanding resources from the mission that 
could otherwise be used to carry out protection of civilians 
outside the bases. Regardless of the existence of the PoC 
sites, UNMISS would still face the same challenges as they 
did prior to the PoC sites in terms of resources, personnel, 
security and access. As a result, the existence of the PoC 
sites has become a convenient scapegoat for why UNMISS 
cannot successfully carry out its mandate outside its own 
perimeters.
UNMISS has also taken direct action to prevent the creation 
of new PoCs. At the end of 2015, UN High Commissioner 
for Refugees (UNHCR) reported tens of thousands of newly 
displaced civilians in Western Equatoria due to eruptions of 
armed violence between SPLA and local groups.26 According 
to an INGO manager, in January 2016 in yambio, Western 
Equatoria, people fled to the UNMISS base for protection 
(Interview 101). Unlike 2013, the IDPs were refused entry to 
the base and instead were directed to an INGO compound 
nearby. For a couple of nights, 5,000–7,000 IDPs stayed 
in the INGO compound before returning home. During that 
period, UNMISS provided perimeter security for the INGO 
compound. This incident raises a number of serious ques-
tions regarding both the perceptions UNMISS has regarding 
their understanding of humanitarian space and if the current 
protocol is now to refuse entry of IDPs to UNMISS bases. 
Reiterating a report in 2011 regarding former mission, 
UNMIS 1, “the Security Council had created false 
expectations as to the capacities of the TCC troops. In 
reality, for political and economic reasons, the Member 
States were not committed to invest the necessary 
resources or personnel required for a Chapter VII 
mandate.”27, 28 UNMISS did not have the ability or resources 
to successfully protect civilians outside its bases before 
the conflict, and the same limitations will still exist even if 
the PoC sites are closed. If it is impossible for UNMISS to 
successfully carry out its protection of civilians mandate, 
due to the relative scale of the country and its limited 
resources, then the mandate needs to be amended to 
a realistic objective. If the mandate remains the same, 
member states should give the mission the resources it 
needs to succeed and mission leadership should prioritize 
resources and be transparent to the South Sudanese and 
others regarding its actual capacity to protect.
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Protection of Civilians Mandate
The findings and recommendations of two previous 
reports on the challenges faced by former UN Mission in 
Sudan (UNMIS) 1 and its successor, UNMISS, in carrying 
out the protection of civilian mandate prove to be just 
as relevant years later. In the first study of UNMIS 1, 
conducted by Ingrid Marie Breidlid and Jon Harald Sande 
Lie in 2011, the researchers found
"Civilian protection actors and local government 
officials expressed considerable frustration over the 
UNMIS military, arguing there was no will or intention 
on the part of the military commanders to contribute 
to protection. And even if there had been such will 
among the commanders on the ground, they would 
have been unequipped for the assignment."
"Some even questioned the capacity of the military to 
protect its own premises and staff, referring to several 
incidents of burglaries in the UNMIS compound. The 
commanders were also seen to be bound hand and foot 
due to their inability to take decisions without approval 
from the higher command. As one UN staff member 
lamented: ‘If a convoy is attacked the military troops 
would not even be able to shoot back unless they have 
a “go ahead” from the contingent commander.’ The 
military side was therefore seen as merely symbolic, 
not an actual protection force.”29 (p. 18)
Although there was change in mandate from Chapter VI 
to Chapter VII when UNMIS 1 changed to UNMISS in July 
2011, the challenges on the ground for the new mission 
persisted, even with a more robust mandate. A consequent 
assessment of the protection of civilians strategy in 2013 
by Jort Hemmer examined how overambitious the new 
mandate was. The report stated:
“UNMISS’s broad and ambiguous mandate and overly 
ambitious PoC objectives have created and perpetuate 
expectations that it will never be able to meet. To break 
the cycle of unfulfilled promises and capitalize on its 
existing potential the recommendations to UNMISS’s 
leadership are to 
1. specify the mission’s understanding of an role in PoC;
2. further prioritize its PoC activities on the basis of a realistic 
assessment of existing demands on the ground, the 
mission’s actual capabilities, its comparative advantages 
relative to other actors, and its political room to manoeuvre;
3. review accordingly the resources it requires; and
4. act decisively and- with an eye to its temporary stay in 
South Sudan- responsibility.”30 (p. 1)
It is telling that the findings and recommendations of these 
two reports, from five and three years ago, respectively, are 
still accurate and very applicable to the mission in 2016. A 
central point for UNMISS leadership, DPKO and member 
states is to recognize the primary challenges and make the 
necessary reforms and improvements.  Over the past five 
years, self-reflection on shortcomings has not produced 
practical policy change. 
years later, the same recommendations from 2011 and 
2013 were again reiterated in interviews with key UNMISS 
staff. For example, the former military chief of staff, Petter 
Lindqvist, lamented that “the eternal predicament I faced 
as UNMISS chief of staff was that the mission was trying 
to do everything and be everywhere. UNMISS had difficulty 
prioritizing” (12 January 2016). In consequence, UNMISS has 
contributed to creating unrealistic expectations regarding its 
capability to protect civilians. Some factors, such as a lack 
of troops, funding and logistical and access constraints will 
continue to be restrictive and limit UNMISS’s capability to 
project outside their bases. 
The mission is challenged by unrealistic expectations, 
prioritization of its limited assets and forces, the repeated 
violations of the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) by the 
government and the perception of UNMISS forces as soft 
targets. Repeated perimeter breaches of its own bases, and 
the attacks on the Bor PoC site in April 2014 and Malakal 
PoC site in February 2016, particularly, reinforce the 
impression that if forces cannot even protect themselves 
or civilians in their bases, then they are unable to protect 
civilians outside (see case study on the right). 
In certain cases, such as the attack on Akobo in December 
2013, the reported large numbers of civilian attackers 
prevented an adequate response by UNMISS peacekeeping 
forces deployed to the base.31 However, there have also 
been many cases where UNMISS failed to protect civilians 
within their base and adjacent to their perimeters. A 
recent piece in the New york Times states that, in 2015, 
“Government soldiers and affiliated militias in particular 
attacked and harassed civilians moving in and out of the 
centers, abducting or killing them, raping some women and 
looting, the United Nations reported. At least 39 people were 
killed in the vicinity of one of the sites at Bentiu between 
January and October.”32
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Questions have been raised by reports regarding UNMISS’s 
lack of timely responses and repeated failures in protecting 
civilians inside and in the vicinity of its bases. If the warring 
parties are willing to abduct, rape and kill civilians nearby, 
or even in the presence of UNMISS forces, then attempts 
to project their presence further out will likely have similar, 
if not weaker, ramifications unless reforms are carried out. 
Importantly, UNMISS risks losing further legitimacy among 
the population if these cases continue. A recent UN report 
reveals the recognition of necessary reforms by DPKO 
and member states for peacekeeping missions around the 
world, including UNMISS. Some of the recommendations 
from the recent UN High-Level Independent Panel on Peace 
Operations (HIPPO) report regarding peace keeping missions 
working in conflict management scenarios were that 
“to operate with even limited success in such settings:
a. The mandate must be clear and achievable and linked to a 
political strategy
b. Mission objectives should be as focused as possible (i.e. 
working towards an agreement to end hostilities, offering 
confidence - building measures, promoting political 
dialogue, protecting civilians and monitoring and reporting 
on human rights) 
 …
g. They must operate on the assumption that the use of force 
may be necessary from the outset to protect civilians and to 
defend the mission and its mandate, as set out in paragraph 
128. Contingents must deploy with the necessary equipment 
and training and a clear understanding of the mission rules 
of engagement (p. 44).”33
The challenges peace keeping missions face are well 
recognized and accepted. The HIPPO report stated that 
“we have collectively failed the people of South Sudan” 
(ibid., p. 3).  To ensure that the international community 
never has to say that again, it is time the necessary 
reforms are carried out in action not just in words.
On the afternoon of 7 May 2015, a fight was reported 
in the Bentiu PoC site marketplace. It is believed that Leek 
Nuer youth attacked Bul Nuer traders in retaliation for the 
atrocities being committed by the SPLA and allied Bul Nuer 
youth in southern Rubkona County at that time. Later that 
afternoon, seven men with spears were seen leaving the 
PoC site through the southern breach and heading towards 
Rubkona.
 
The same night, a mixed force of armed civilians and 
soldiers in uniform breached the perimeter of the PoC site. 
Witnesses reported that the soldiers sought out specific 
tukuls, thus leading to speculations of inside information from 
PoC residents, likely the seven men who had left the site for 
Rubkona that same day. News of the breach quickly spread 
and approximately 500 IDPs sought shelter at the UNPOL 
post by the market. IDPs reported that UNMISS forces left 
the area of the breach, further causing panic among the 
residents. UNPOL responded quickly and sought to calm 
down the situation at the market; however, they could not 
enter the breached area without being accompanied by 
armed forces. It took approximately 40 minutes from the 
initial breach for UNPOL to reach the location with the 
Ethiopian Battalion. 45 minutes after the armed actors first 
entered the base, a shot was heard and witnesses claim that 
the attackers immediately withdrew, suggesting a degree of 
coordination. 
The Mongolian Battalion had previously agreed to place an 
Armed Personnel Carrier in an area where a large southern 
breach existed as deterrence; however, they had failed to 
do so that night. While it is troubling that the Bentiu PoC 
site had still yet to be fully fenced by December 2015, it 
was negligent that the southern breach was not repaired for 
weeks during that period. Previously, the breach, which was 
in sight of an observation post, had also been used by gang 
members as an easy means to escape the site and evade 
capture by UNPOL. While UNPOL and humanitarian actors 
responded immediately to news of IDPs amassing at the 
market, UNMISS forces were considerably slower and the 
response of the Quick Reaction Force (QRF) took 40 minutes 
to assemble. Humanitarian actors were very concerned 
about the level of coordination and the weaknesses in 
UNMISS’s response to armed actors entering the PoC site 
to search for civilians.
Case Study
Bentiu PoC Site
Perimeter Breach 7 May 201534
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Targeting of UNMISS
The perception that UNMISS is not 
willing to use force was also an issue even 
before the December 2013 crisis.
young men interviewed across Jonglei in 2012 and 2013 
believed that UNMISS troops carried no ammunition for their 
weapons and were soft targets.35 The tragic attack on peace-
keepers in Pibor in April 2013, which led to the deaths of five 
Indian peacekeepers and seven civilian staff, underlined this 
perception as the attackers, reportedly teenagers, escaped 
largely unscathed.36 In the pre-crisis April 2013 “Guidelines 
for civilians seeking protection at UNMISS bases,” it states 
that “It is not considered likely that UNMISS bases in which 
civilians have sought protection will be overrun by armed 
actors in the same way as Srebrenica” (p. 3). Only days after 
the conflict erupted this assumption proved untrue. 
On 19 December 2013, the UNMISS base in Akobo was 
overrun by armed youth, and at least 27 Dinka civilians 
seeking protection inside were killed along with two peace-
keepers. UNMISS reported that 2,000 Lou Nuer youth had 
attacked the base, meaning that UNMISS was outnumbered 
and there was little it could have done to repel the aggressors. 
Still, the perception that UNMISS soldiers are soft targets 
was reiterated. Only four months later, the major UNMISS 
base in Bor was attacked by a “large group of armed individ-
uals” who were protesting in front of the gates in April 2014.37 
According to the UNMISS report on the event, rumours of 
an attack against the IDPs in the Bor PoC site existed weeks 
before the incident occurred and there is significant evidence 
to suggest that it was a well-planned attack (ibid.).
Celebrations by the Bor IDPs after the capture of Bentiu by 
SPLA-IO forces on 15 April further exacerbated tensions 
between Nuer IDPs in the Bor PoC site and Dinka residents in 
Bor town. A group of between 100 and 300 Dinka protesters 
marched to the Bor PoC site on the morning of 17 April from 
Bor town. Reports reached UNMISS by 9:30, and UNMISS 
closed the main gate of the base (ibid., p. 19). However, 
the armed group walked to the other PoC gate instead, 
and, at 10:55, some of the members forced their way over 
the perimeter and then opened the gates to let in the rest 
of the group (ibid., p. 20). Once they breached the PoC site, 
the attackers killed at least 47 civilians and beat, looted and 
abducted Nuer IDPs staying in the site for protection. At least 
100 people, including two peacekeepers, were injured.
A QRF was deployed by UNMISS 20 minutes after the 
attack began and reached the PoC site ten minutes later 
(ibid., pp. 21–22). Meanwhile, government forces stood by 
and observed the attack, and at one point even prevented 
the other QRF from moving around the base to flank the 
attackers (ibid., p. 22). Despite 90 minutes of warning that 
an armed mob was approaching the gates and after weeks 
of rumours of an imminent attack, the attackers had a 
further 30 minutes within the base to attack the IDPs before 
they were confronted by UNMISS military. By the time 
the perpetrators were engaged by the QRF and chased 
out of the camp, dozens of civilians were murdered and 
even more injured (ibid., p. 22). While at least three of the 
perpetrators died, no arrests or punitive actions have been 
made (ibid., p. 29).
The incident caused significant frustrations and raised 
questions within and outside the mission about how these 
types of breaches could occur within an UNMISS base. 
After receiving information about the attack, some IDPs in 
the Bentiu PoC site travelled by foot and raft all the way 
to Akobo on the border of Ethiopia, a distance of 400 km. 
Despite having to cross half the country and multiple front 
lines of the conflict, these IDPs deemed it safer than staying 
in the Bentiu PoC site.38
The incident is an illustration of the belief among 
some South Sudanese civilians that UNMISS has lost 
its legitimacy as an actor who can protect them. 
The chief of staff of UNMISS military at the time, Petter 
Lindqvist, explained that to understand how these type 
of failures occur, three factors of peacekeeping have to 
be recognized: variation in the quality of troops, lack of 
experience many TCCs have with joint operations, and 
philosophical differences between member states and 
mission leadership as to whether UNMISS is purely a 
monitoring and observation mission and if and when the 
use of force is to be sanctioned.
- UNMISS and the PoC Sites
Interviews of Murle and Lou Nuer youth from earlier research by the author in Jonglei State, 
2012 and 2013. 
Sudan Tribune. “Jonglei ambush kills 5 UN peacekeepers, 7 civilian staff,” 9 April 2013.
UNMISS, Attacks on Civilians in Bentiu and Bor April 2014, 9 January 2015.
Interviews of IDP women from earlier research in Akobo, by the author, March 2014.
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Peacekeepers stand guard before a food distribution queue. © IOM 2015 Photo: Brendan Bannon
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As she is married to a Nuer she felt at risk of being targeted
as she and her children all share her husband's ethnic identity
Childhood in the Bentiu PoC site. © IOM 2015 Photo: Brendan Bannon
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Nyachen is a Shilluk woman originally from the Malakal 
area, but she moved with her husband, a Nuer, to Bor 
due to his work as a government official. They lived in 
Bor with their six children for eight years before the 
conflict broke out. When fighting began in Pandiar, the 
SPLA base outside Bor, her family fled to the UNMISS 
base for protection. As she is married to a Nuer, she feels 
at risk of being targeted as she and her children all share 
her husband’s ethnic identity. When SPLA-IO took over 
Bor some Nuer left the PoC to travel to Akobo, but for 
Nyachen it was too far to walk with children. 
On 17 April 2014, Nyachen was working for an NGO 
in the Bor PoC site cleaning latrines when she heard a 
message that Dinka youth had entered the PoC site and 
were attacking IDPs.  She ran to find her children. Her 
husband had already closed all six of their children in 
their home for protection. She took the children and ran 
towards the South Korean Battalion area, thinking they 
would be safe there. Many people were killed around her 
as they ran, but they safely reached the destination. The 
UNMISS peacekeepers at the gate did shoot in the air 
to prevent the Dinka youth from entering the UNMISS 
base, and eventually other soldiers appeared and began 
to shoot and chase the attackers away.
Since the attack Nyachen’s husband traveled by air 
with three of their children to Juba, where they stayed 
temporarily in the UN House PoC site. From there, the 
three children went by bus to a refugee camp in Arua, 
Uganda. The rest of her Shilluk family are living at the 
UNMISS PoC in Malakal. 
Nyachen
Bor PoC Site
Shilluk woman married to Nuer man
30–40 years old
... many people were killed around her 
as they ran, but they safely reached the 
destination
Top: long queues for medical care in the Malakal PoC site. 
Bottom: registration exercises are completed regularly in order to track new arrivals and to provide planning figures for interventions and services. © IOM 2015 Photos: B. Bannon
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Managing the Response
Leadership
One of the most consistent themes that arose over three 
months of interviews was the lack of leadership exercised 
among UNMISS and humanitarians. Those interviewed 
claimed that few members of the organizations involved 
were willing to make bold decisions or take responsibility 
for responding to the violence. It was noted that a few 
individuals and organizations took the initiative to “fill 
gaps” and moved toward creating a positive response, but 
that in general both UNMISS and agencies (UN and NGO) 
demonstrated a failure to assume responsibility and enact 
accountability.  Most actors did not engage in self-reflection, 
asking how their response could be improved; rather, they 
sought to blame others for the negative outcomes. This 
lack of critical thinking led to a general paralysis, with the 
result that many key actors failed to make vital and timely 
decisions from fear of being held accountable for potentially 
negative consequences of their actions.
Ultimately, the Government of South Sudan is responsible 
for the security of its people and providing basic services. 
Nevertheless, the entire existence of UNMISS, the civil war 
and the declaration of L3 emergency status39 illustrates 
the widespread recognition that the Government does not 
possess the capacity to provide either protection of civilians 
or basic services. Despite this undisputed recognition and 
the practical consequences which it implies, UNMISS (and 
all UN agencies) continue to retreat to the defensive stance, 
which claims that the “South Sudanese government is 
responsible.” A noteworthy example of this position occurred 
as a response to a claim in the media by MSF that UNMISS 
had failed to protect civilians in southern Unity. An UNMISS 
spokesperson stated the official position as follows: “We 
underscore that the responsibility to protect civilians is 
primarily the responsibility of the host government, and 
the warring parties are directly responsible for their actions 
in violation of international human rights and humanitarian 
law. The mission rejects the allegation by MSF of a complete 
and utter protection failure on the part of UNMISS.”40 
UNMISS’s mandate from the UN Security Council is the 
protection of civilians; this mandate is interpreted broadly by 
the humanitarian community but is internalized narrowly by 
UNMISS when defending its response in crises. 
Likewise, many humanitarian actors have not shown 
initiative or independence in their response. Humanitarian 
actors consistently assert “distinction” and “humanitarian 
space” issues with UNMISS, while at the same time routinely 
assume their “right” to live and work on UNMISS bases 
and demand UNMISS flights and Force Protection escorts 
and “presence” when required. While the completely new 
environment of IDPs in a military base has demanded 
flexibility by all stakeholders, humanitarian actors have 
demonstrated too much dependence on UNMISS, some 
still depending on them two years into the conflict. For 
example, as recently as October 2015, a new NGO arriving 
at a PoC site demanded the donation of UNMISS assets in 
order to set up their programmes (Interview 12). This type 
of entitled demands for UNMISS assets and resources has 
created resentment within the mission, as was made clear 
in a number of interviews with UNMISS staff (Interviews 
17, 21, 30, 32). On the other hand a lack of understanding 
within sections of UNMISS regarding the need for distinction 
between humanitarians and the mission has also been a 
major challenge. For example, at the end of 2015 UNMISS 
established a new base in a temporarily empty INGO 
compound in Leer, Unity state, restricting the return of the 
INGO to the area and blurring the distinction between a 
military actor and humanitarians (Interview 68).
In addition, former and current humanitarian cluster coordinators 
expressed frustration with NGO partners’ overdependence on 
humanitarian cluster infrastructure to provide supplies, needs 
assessments, contextual understanding and identification of 
protection concerns; while, at the same time, demonstrating 
limited capacity (Interviews 68, 91). Although few humanitarian 
organizations possess the capacity to function independent 
of UNMISS or cluster support, agency-specific capacity 
is a necessity to work in South Sudan at this critical time. 
Regrettably, some humanitarian organizations do not possess 
this required capacity, particularly at the beginning of the crisis 
when several NGOs had relocated all staff and most inquiries, 
decisions and proposals were issued from organizations in 
Nairobi, not South Sudan (Interview 91). 
At the same time, some UN agencies and NGOs ignored 
well-established international standards even after receiving 
feedback and advice by the cluster many months after the 
crisis began (ibid.). For example, one international NGO 
constructed latrines at the PoC Juba site without any regard 
to standards (Interview 91). Often it appeared that many 
humanitarian actors, both UN and NGO, sought to use 
the existing humanitarian cluster system mechanisms to 
avoid responsibility, accountability and risk. Again, some 
organizations “stepped up” to the daunting challenges, 
but the vast majority did not. Too many well-established 
organizations appeared more concerned of how they were 
perceived and increasing their funding as opposed to 
working independently and getting the job done, especially 
in difficult, hard-to-reach locations (Interview 68). The 
systems and processes in place for the humanitarian 
response were created to ensure good coordination and 
that minimum standards of service provision were achieved. 
But at numerous locations, these levels were not achieved, 
especially in the early days of the crisis.  
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As part of the global humanitarian system's classification for the response to the most 
severe, large-scale humanitarian crises, the UN declared South Sudan a “Level 3 (L3)” 
emergency in 2014 to trigger more resources, speed and staff. 
The Guardian, “UN Accused of ‘shocking’ lack of action over murder and rape in South 
Sudan,” 15 December 2015.
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The core reality is that, due to lack of government capacity, 
both UNMISS and humanitarian actors have been mandated 
to assume the responsibilities inherent in the protection of 
civilians. The pragmatic responsibility for UNMISS is the 
physical protection of civilians, and, for humanitarians, 
the responsibility is the provision of life-saving services. 
Unquestionably, this necessitates a vital collaboration 
between UNMISS and humanitarian actors to clearly 
articulate their mutual roles and responsibilities and to 
engage in focused, reflective and cooperative discussion and 
performance evaluation. It is incumbent upon these players 
to sustain a cooperative and collegial work environment 
in order to meet the enormous needs of the IDPs seeking 
protection at UNMISS PoC sites. Moreover, beyond the 
PoC sites, additional UN agencies, such as OCHA and UN 
Department of Safety and Security (UNDSS), need to work 
together better and establish clear protection of civilian roles 
and responsibilities (Interviews 91, 94).
Humanitarian Coordination 
Many humanitarian respondents working both within and 
outside of PoC sites identified the significant and widespread 
focus on coordination that exists at the cost of actual 
programming in South Sudan (Interviews 45, 49, 68). As the 
humanitarian industry has grown and professionalized over 
the past decade, the systems of coordination have greatly 
expanded. As with any industry, when staffing, funding and 
programmes expand, the administration and bureaucracy 
required to manage and support the programming also grow 
exponentially. A critical mass exists, which, if surpassed, 
results in additional resources being used to maintain the 
system itself at the expense of operational capacity. 
In South Sudan, there are too many “coordinators,”41 too 
many humanitarian organizations working at the PoC 
sites and far too few organizations working in deep-field 
locations. With the notable exceptions of MSF and ICRC, 
the vast number of humanitarian actors have demonstrated 
a preference for establishing bases at the UNMISS PoC 
sites, as opposed to establishing operational capacity in the 
deep field, where humanitarian needs are particularly acute. 
One clear recommendation of this report is to encourage 
humanitarian actors to “rationalize” presence at PoC sites 
with the same criteria used in refugee camps or IDP camps 
throughout the world (Interviews 45, 49, 89, 94). Specifically, 
humanitarian actors should identify a few key organizations 
to assume responsibility for sectoral functions within the PoC 
sites and encourage other humanitarian actors to establish 
operations in the deep field (Interviews 7, 68). Donors, too, 
should be encouraged to support organizations willing and 
capable of working in these locations. Finally, it is vital to 
note that at this time in South Sudan, 
30 per cent of the humanitarian budget is spent 
on activities at the PoC sites, home to only 14 
per cent of South Sudan’s IDPs.
An Environment of Unpredictable Conflict 
and Evolving Dynamics
PoC site camp managers, without exception, cite the dynamic 
and unpredictable nature of the larger environment in which 
they work as a major challenge to achieving their objectives. 
Circumstances and actions beyond the control of UNMISS 
and humanitarians frequently hinder and undermine ongoing 
attempts to expand sites and improve living conditions for 
the IDP population. Numerous examples of these negative 
impacts exist, but they are best illustrated by the events that 
have unfolded at the Malakal and Bentiu PoC sites.
Changing Alliances in Malakal
Among PoC sites, Malakal is unique. While all other sites 
provide protection for predominately Nuer IDP populations, 
Malakal accommodates a mixed population of IDPs. 
Moreover, war events have changed the composition of this 
population significantly. Control of Malakal town has changed 
a dozen times since the conflict began two years ago. Before 
the February 2016 attack, the population of Malakal PoC site 
includes approximately 40,000 Shilluk, 4,000 Dinka, 3,500 
Nuer and several hundred Darfuri traders.
The conflict in Malakal began on 24 December 2013. Within 
days, 20,000 IDPs, mostly all from Malakal town, fled to the 
UNMISS base and began occupying all areas of the base, 
including civilian staff accommodations, offices and areas 
designated for force battalion and logistics use. UNMISS 
and humanitarian actors responded quickly to the crisis 
and, during the following months, continued to address the 
needs presented by this unprecedented challenge. By June 
2014, a new PoC area adjacent to the UNMISS base had 
been established, and, by August 2014, the vast majority of 
IDPs had been relocated to this area (Sector 1 on the map). 
Considerable support from humanitarian donors provided 
for the development of Sector 2 of the PoC site and accom-
modation of all remaining IDPs.
Intense fighting, including six separate “takeovers”, in 
Malakal town continued from December 2013 until April 
2014, but, by June 2014, there was relative peace. During 
the following ten months, IDPs at the Malakal PoC site 
moved to and from Malakal town, a distance of five km, 
with regularity. This freedom of movement enabled them 
to protect their property. As time passed, Malakal town, 
once completely destroyed, began to come back to life. 
Development donors became interested in funding town 
infrastructure in an attempt to entice IDPs to return to their 
homes. It appeared that Malakal, and indeed all of Upper 
Nile, was returning to calm (Interview 20).
The environment at the Malakal PoC site, however, was 
not calm. During this period, inter-communal tension and 
occasional violence erupted between two groups: IDPs from 
the Dinka and Shilluk tribes, who were aligned at that time, 
and IDPs from the Nuer tribe, the predominant tribe of the 
SPLA-IO. Numerous incidents of violence were perpetrated 
against Nuer IDPs, who remained entrenched in the 
extremely congested UNMISS logistics base, even though 
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better accommodations at the newly established PoC site 
adjacent to the base had been made available to them. 
In late March 2015, the dynamics of the situation changed 
once again. Land tensions between the Shilluk and Dinka 
in Akoka, Upper Nile, involving strong legacies from the 
post-CPA period, culminated in armed conflict between the 
two communities. Johnson Olony, the Shilluk commander 
then allied with the Government, sent his deputy and 
soldiers to mitigate an issue in Akoka. Their arrival, however, 
was perceived as a hostile act and Olony’s deputy and 
others were killed (Interviews 20, 57). This sparked the end 
of the alliance between Shilluk forces led by Olony and 
the Government, and reignited the longstanding conflict 
dynamic between the Dinka Padang and Shilluk over control 
of the east bank of the White Nile River. Olony warned 
Shilluk civilians of potential clashes, instructing them to 
leave Malakal town for the Malakal PoC site (Interview 20).
As soon as Malakal town was emptied of civilians, violence 
erupted between the Governor’s bodyguards and forces 
aligned with Olony. Malakal town changed hands four times 
between 21 April and 17 May 2015; during that time, the 
Malakal PoC site population increased from 22,000 to more 
than 30,000. On 23 May, Olony officially changed alliances 
and joined the SPLA-IO. The Dinka Padang, with a firm hold 
on all local levers of military and political power, escalated 
their campaign against Shilluk forces and civilians alike. 
The SPLA blocked humanitarian supplies from reaching 
Shilluk populations in “rebel-held” areas (Interview 103). This 
resulted in movement of an additional 17,000 IDPs, 90 per 
cent women and children, moving to the PoC site between 15 
July and 10 August. The impact of this influx was immediate 
and challenging in the extreme. Within four months, the PoC 
site population increased more than 100 per cent, presenting 
UNMISS staff and humanitarian actors with the broad 
spectrum of problems inherent in a dangerously congested 
environment (OCHA, IOM). On 23 July, the SPLA suspended 
all river movement on the Nile River, leading to market food 
shortages in the PoC site (Small Arms Survey, p.18).
In response, UNMISS and humanitarians worked in unison 
to establish new areas for the IDPs within the UNMISS base 
but outside of the Mission Support Area.42 In the four months 
between August and December 2015, humanitarians 
established Sectors 3 and 4 (see above map) and relocated 
IDPs outside of the UNMISS base. Between late October 
and early December, prominent donors visited Malakal PoC 
site and noted, in agreement, that the conditions remained 
extremely congested, posing threats of disease, fire and 
civil unrest (Interview 104).
On 10 January, a fire broke out in an extremely congested 
area of the PoC site, resulting in the death of one IDP and 
injuring eight others. In addition, 81 shelters were destroyed 
and 257 households, or 1,575 IDPs, were displaced within the 
site. Following this devastation, UNMISS permitted construc-
tion to commence for the PoC site expansion.
On 2 October 2015, President Kiir announced the creation 
of 28 states from the previous ten, and, on 24 December 
2015, appointed governors for these new states. This 
political action dramatically increased tension along tribal 
lines throughout the entire country, but nowhere was this 
tension felt more deeply than in Malakal. The 28 states gave 
administrative backing to the Dinka struggle for dominance 
of the east bank, including Malakal and outlying areas that 
are contested by both the Dinka and Shilluk (Small Arms 
Survey, p. 1). The appointments of a Dinka governor and 
a Dinka commissioner for Malakal and the dismissal of all 
non-Dinka servants from the Government were perceived 
by the Shilluk as acts of war.
Within this context, tension at the Malakal PoC site was 
palpable. Of the 48,000 IDPs at the site, 40,000 were Shilluk. 
Moreover, the vast majority of them had previously lived at 
Malakal town, only five kilometres away. Their once thriving 
town, which previously placed second after Juba as the most 
developed city in South Sudan, had been destroyed by two 
years of war. It had become an SPLA garrison town, the city’s 
infrastructure had been completely destroyed and all civilians 
had fled. Now, it was populated only by men with guns.
Rainy Season/Dry Season in South Sudan 
and the Season of Fighting in Unity State
Between December 2013 and March 2014 the number of 
IDPs seeking protection at the UNMISS Bentiu PoC site 
was approximately 4,000–7,000.  This was relatively low 
number compared with the situations facing UNMISS and 
humanitarian actors in Juba, Bor and Malakal.  However 
the situation drastically changed on 15 April 2014 with 
the bloody victory of Bentiu Town by Opposition forces. 
During the next six weeks the number of civilians seeking 
protection at the UNMISS Bentiu PoC site increased to 
40,000.  Nearly all of these people were Nuer. In terms both 
of humanitarian response capacity and seasonal conditions, 
this IDP influx could not have happened at a less desirable 
time. Humanitarian resources were stretched in an ongoing 
response to the conditions in Juba, Bor and Malakal, while 
humanitarian actors at Bentiu were few in number. Seasonal 
conditions contributed to the challenges, with an early rainy 
season of prolonged duration. From June to October 2014 
the Bentiu PoC site was essentially a “flood plain,” with IDPs 
living in knee-deep water and UNMISS and humanitarian 
actors unable to improve conditions due to the heavy rains. 
Although the early and long rains had the effect of halting 
the fighting during this period, IDPs chose to remain at the 
flooded but protected site. 
Deputy Humanitarian Coordinator Sue Lautze visited the 
Bentiu PoC site in early October 2014. Acknowledging the 
unfolding grave humanitarian situation, the DHC initiated 
a "Special HCT" on 22 October in Juba, recognizing that 
extremely limited actions could be taken to improve living 
conditions at Bentiu PoC site in 2014. Thus the primary 
objective of this special HCT was to solicit funding for 
improving the site in 2015 and beyond. Within the next 
three months, many humanitarian donors contributed USD 
18 million for renovation and expansion of the site. On 21 
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January 2015, UNMISS successfully negotiated additional 
land for the PoC site expansion. By July 2015, humanitarian 
actors had renovated and expanded the site to an area equal 
to the size of 300 football pitches (Interview 105).
In contrast to 2014, the 2015 dry season was long, with 
intense conflicts taking place throughout Unity State. 
Tragically, this fighting followed a familiar pattern where, 
instead of armed forces fighting one another, warring sides 
attacked civilian villages. Consequences were brutal and 
pervasive.  Men were killed; women and children were 
raped, abducted or sent fleeing into the swamps; huts 
and infrastructure—including schools, medical clinics 
and boreholes—were burned or otherwise destroyed and 
cattle were stolen (Office of the DHC). In the wake of these 
atrocities, Unity civilians fled to the Bentiu PoC site. When 
the PoC site renovation and expansion work began in 
January 2015, the site accommodated 50,000 IDPs; within 
one year, more than 120,000 IDPs were living at the site.
The renovation and expansion of the UNMISS Bentiu 
PoC is a prime example of the different perspectives 
regarding the PoC sites. On one hand, humanitarian actors 
involved in the expansion consider it to be an enormously 
successful accomplishment, which generated the capacity 
to save “tens of thousands of lives” (Interviews 10, 32, 43). 
On the other hand, the UNMISS perspective is often that 
the expansion and services created a draw factor that led 
to the huge influx of IDPs that they must now protect. Most 
likely it is the failure of all actors, including the government, 
to be able to respond and protect civilians outside of the 
bases. As one prominent humanitarian believes, “the failure 
to provide protection of civilians was the responsibility 
of the Government, and secondarily of UNMISS and 
humanitarian actors. We all failed. For six months none 
of the responsible actors was in a position to provide 
protection for the civilians in Unity State. Insecurity and 
widespread violence made the provision of humanitarian 
assistance impossible.”
One of the persistent frustrations expressed by respondents 
was the lack of contextual understanding throughout the 
international community working in South Sudan. History 
often defines worldviews and identity and this is especially 
important in a country that has faced decades of warfare. 
South Sudanese rarely see ongoing conflict dynamics as 
independent of the past, but often there is has been a 
tendency among the humanitarian community, UNMISS 
The rainy season exacerbates public health concerns such as water borne diseases and malaria. © IOM 2015 Photo: Brendan Bannon
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and donors alike to ignore historical dynamics role in the 
current environment. The many microlevel conflicts in rural 
areas are often closely intertwined with contemporary and 
past political and inter-ethnic conflicts.
Conflict zones are complex due to the constantly shifting 
dynamics: fluid alliances, multiple warring parties, shifting 
front lines and legacies of past violence pose significant 
challenges to contextual and conflict analysis in South 
Sudan. It can therefore not be expected that all staff 
members, many of them on a short-term contract, become 
“experts” in the field. However, as indicated by several 
respondents, humanitarian organizations commonly fail to 
rely on international experts on South Sudan, and, more 
importantly, national staff who often have unique insights 
into many of these complex dynamics (Interview 49). Local 
knowledge among civilians is too often ignored. 
Rather than build upon their expertise and strengthen 
existing coping mechanisms, parallel systems are created 
instead. In cases where international experts are brought 
in as consultants or researchers for organizations or 
donors, the research and analysis is often kept internal 
and rarely shared with the wider humanitarian community 
(Interview 68). One respondent, who has worked for both 
UNMISS and an INGO, further argued that expert analysis 
rarely influences programming even for those who contract 
it (Interview 5). When significant resources are spent 
creating and updating immaculately worded policies or 
in-depth analysis and research, the recommendations 
rarely turn into practice. Organizations often recycle similar 
programmes and research with little advancement as 
they are unaware of what has already been done, or even 
what has already failed. Some actors have even redone 
research or failed programmes carried out by their own 
organization only a few years earlier due to a complete 
lack of institutional knowledge.
There is a dependence on a limited number of individuals 
for analysis and understanding, to the point that information 
is rarely institutional and shared less between stakeholders. 
When key individuals leave or are declared persona non 
grata, much of the knowledge and contacts are lost. The 
limited number of country experts means that some are 
over relied upon. Although these issues existed before the 
crisis began, these weaknesses have been amplified by the 
crisis. Institutional memory and contextual analysis are still 
lacking between all actors from UNMISS to humanitarians.
A family of new arrivals make it by truck to the Malakal PoC site with few belongings. © IOM 2015 Photo: Brendan Bannon
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On 21 December 2013, the conflict reached Malakal town. Nearly 
12,000 IDPs and a few hundred humanitarians moved toward the 
Malakal UNMISS base and sought shelter inside as the SPLA and 
SPLA/IO fought for control of Malakal town. By mid-January, the number 
of IDPs had swelled to more than 20,000. The scene was chaotic with 
humanitarians and IDPs living in haphazard conditions and spread over 
the entire UNMISS facility. Humanitarian agencies and UNMISS imme-
diately began providing assistance, including food, access to safe water, 
construction of latrines and medical treatment as well. The UNMISS 
base was not designed to accommodate IDPs and most lived in five 
sections spread across a large area, even taking over a logistics center 
and a workshop. 
There was a need to improve the living conditions and first improvement 
to the UNMISS base was a joint venture with UNMISS and IOM to level 
a large area outside the southern gate and adjacent to the base. The 
area was levelled, drainage installed, some land raised and plotted to 
allow for 12,500 IDPs. Even though expectations of moving all IDPs from 
the base were not achieved, the area inside the UNMISS was greatly 
decongested in 2014. The second improvement was an expansion of 
320,000 m2. In July 2015, IOM, UNMISS and humanitarian agencies 
completed an extension of the site which was designed to house the 
remaining population plus a contingency area, possibly holding 18,000 
individuals. The expansion enabled IDPs to move out of the UNMISS 
logistics base onto land designed with adequate drainage, space and 
access to relief services.  However, continued violence in Upper Nile 
led to successive wave of IDPs seeking protection and services within 
the PoC and this figure was quickly surpassed, increasing form 22,000 
in April 2015 to more than 48,800 in August 2015. Two additional 
contingency areas were quickly developed to shelter an influx of nearly 
17,000 IDPs who arrived in late July and early August.
Malakal PoC site satellite view, September 2015 / Population: 44,000+ IDPs.
Malakal PoC site satellite view, July 2015 / Population: 42,000+ IDPs.
Malakal PoC site satellite view, June 2014 / Population: 11,000+ IDPs.
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IDPs in Malakal PoC site wait in long queues to fill their containers with safe drinking water. © IOM 2015 Photo: Brendan Bannon
Timeline: Malakal PoC Site Population Trend
4. Increased tension within 
PoC site. Dinka and Shilluk 
aligned against Nuer.
5. PoC site figure steady at 
17,000 for ten months. 
Widespread freedom 
of mouvement. Traders 
return to Malakal Town. 
Development donors 
express interest.
6. Increased tension between 
SPLA Dinka and Shilluk.  23 
May Johnson Olony defects 
and war stopped. Malakal 
airport closed off from 15 
June to 1 August.
7. No humanitarian flights 
mid-June to August due 
to insecurity. Poc site 
population nearly triples 
between March and 
October 2015. Women and 
children arrive from Wau 
Shilluk due to lack of food 
assistance and protection 
concerns.
1. 24 December 2013  
Fighting reaches Malakal. 
20,000 civilians seek 
protection at UNMISS 
base.
2. Relative calm   
Many IDPs travel to Sudan 
via Renk.
3. Relative calm   
Influx of 6,000 Shilluk IDPs 
from west side of the Nile.
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According to some reports, rock-throwing between Dinka IDPs in 
Sector 2 and Shilluk IDPs in Sector 1 of the PoC site on 17 February 
escalated to gun violence among IDP youth, leading to large-scale 
death and destruction. However, these reports leave out other events 
that led to the violence. Several days prior to the eruption of violence, 
holes were cut in both the internal and external fences of the Dinka IDP 
area in Sector 2. It was through these compromised fences that Dinka 
women and children departed the site prior to, and immediately at, the 
onset of the conflict and were transported to Malakal town on trucks.  
Moreover, these same fence holes were the entry points for the armed 
actors who entered the PoC site late in the evening on 17 February, 
the time when the automatic weapon fire and the burning of shelters 
began. It is to be noted that all Dinka and Darfuri shelters in Sector 
2 remained intact and the vast majority Nuer shelters were burned to 
the ground. In addition, the medical clinic and school that served both 
the Nuer and Dinka population were also torched. In the all-Shilluk 
Sector 3, 75 per cent of all shelters were burned, and a huge swath of 
shelters were also burned in the all-Shilluk Sector 1. At the conclusion 
of this violence, at least 25 IDPs died, 120 sustained injury (75% due 
to bullet wounds) and 1,521 IDP shelters were burned (Protection 
Cluster, CCCM, Small Arms Survey).
In the aftermath of this deadly and violently destructive attack, the 
capacity of UNMISS to protect IDPs at PoC sites is being seriously 
questioned. Doubts are underscored by the presence of an atmosphere 
of high tension within the site in the days preceding the attack, as 
well as a failure to respond to the IDP Peace and Reconciliation 
Committee’s notification of the cut fences adjacent to the Dinka area 
at Sector 2 prior to the attack. Despite these warning signs, the mission 
was unprepared to stop armed forces from entering the camp, shooting 
IDPs, burning shelters and destroying humanitarian assets. Moreover, 
immediately after the violence began, Force Protection retreated to 
their battalion areas, a disturbing and unexplainable manoeuvre. They 
did not return for 16 hours. 
The attack on the Malakal PoC site occurred in the wider context of 
an ongoing war between the Dinka and Shilluk for control of Malakal 
and contested areas on the east bank of the White Nile River. The 
establishment of the 28 states has greatly intensified this contest. Shilluk 
people on the east bank, now clustered inside the PoC site, must make 
a choice about their physical security versus abandoning their claim 
to Malakal. This is the fundamental dynamic driving the intentions of 
Shilluk IDPs in the PoC site, not access to services or implementation 
of the peace agreement, which does not address the Shilluk question. 
Given this current Dinka–Shilluk dynamic, it is incumbent upon 
UNMISS and humanitarian actors to quickly rehabilitate the current 
PoC site, expand the site in order to decongest the area and prepare 
contingency areas for the reception of additional IDPs.
•	 22:30	 Fighting	erupted	in	PoC	site.	Gunfire	from	
within	PoC	site.	Reports	of	firing	from	outside	of	PoC	
site.
•	 UNPOL	intervence	with	tear	gas	to	disperse	crowd.
•	 Majority	of	Dinka	IDPs	flee	to	Malakal	town.
•	 Violence	continues.
•	 Reports	of	6	deaths	and	40	injured.
•	 Armed	actors	breached	the	perimeter,	moving	into	
Sector	2.
•	 IDPs	move	from	newer	area	of	PoC	site	(sectors	1,	2,	3	
and	4)	through	Charlie	Gate	into	the	old	PoC	site	and	
UNMISS	logistics	base.
•	 Armed	actors	move	into	Sector	1.	Afternoon,	gunfire	
heard	from	in	Sector	1,	fire	still	burning	in	Sector	2.
•	 Medical	staff	forced	to	move	into	UNMISS	base.
•	 Afternoon,	UNMISS	fires	at	armed	actors	who	have	
breached	the	compound.
•	 12:00	Humanitarian	surge	team	arrives	in	Malakal	along	
with	6.5	MT	of	lifesaving	health	and	WASH	supplies.
•	 14:00	Humanitarians	assess	PoC	sectors	to	determine	
immediate	needs.
•	 14:00	Emergency	health	clinics	are	operational,	
replacing	those	that	were	destroyed/looted.
•	 Treated	drinking	water	is	trucked	to	the	old	PoC	sites	
where	over	25,000	are	seeking	protection.
Feb.	17
Feb.	18
Feb.	19
Timeline
Malakal PoC site satellite view February 20 2016 (detail).
The information from this section was shared by humanitarians based in Malakal PoC site 
at the time of event (Interview 103).
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47,000
Estimated IDP population as of February 2016
25,000
Estimated IDPs seeking refuge inside UNMISS Log Base
25  50
People killed People injured
Humanitarian Losses
1 health clinic destroyed / 1 health clinic looted /
2,300 shelters destroyed / Damaged water and sanitation 
infrastructure
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Tension	Erupts:
Death	and	Destruction	at	Malakal	PoC	Site
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Top: destruction of the Malakal PoC site, view on February 20. © UNMISS 2016
Bottom: thousands of families lost their homes to fires that swept through the site during the attack. © IOM 2016 Photo: Gonzalez
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"If we leave we are killed"
PoC site residents in Malakal gather to address UNMISS. © OCHA 2016 Photo: Charlotte Cans
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Apon is an old man who used to be a farmer before the 
conflict and lived in Malakal town. In the first attack by 
Nuer (SPLA-IO) on Malakal, his wife was killed. Some 
Nuer (SPLA-IO or Lou Nuer White Army) abducted 
him in order to protect him from others who wanted to 
kill him, and he was spared. They walked for seven days 
and crossed the Sobat River, all the way to Lankien, in 
Nyirol, Jonglei. Four men, who were all abductees, were 
put together, and on the journey they were fed porridge 
and water. When they arrived, they found women and 
more than eight children who had also been abducted, 
but shortly thereafter they were separated. 
After arriving in Lankien a Shilluk woman named 
Nyakodok, who was married to a Nuer man and 
therefore had a Nuer identity, took the abducted men 
in to her house. Nyakodok worked for a UN agency 
before the conflict and had also travelled from Malakal 
to Lankien after the SPLA-IO took over. The four men 
stayed at Nyakodok’s house for over a year and received 
food rations through her. When the Shilluk militia of 
Johnson Olony changed alliances from the government 
to the opposition in April 2015, part of the agreement 
was the return of abducted Shilluk civilians. Apon and 
other men, one who was disabled and had to walk all 
the way to Lankien from Malakal with a walking stick, 
were put on a lorry and driven back to Canal and the 
town of Warjok next to the Nile River. From there, they 
were put on a ship belonging to Olony’s movement and 
were taken to the UNMISS Malakal PoC site. Apon only 
saw old men who were abducted being released, not 
any women and children. Upon arrival in the Malakal 
PoC site, he found one of his sons there, the others were 
alive but had travelled to Juba. His sons had assumed 
Apon was dead. Apon wants to return to Malakal town 
when there is peace. “The PoC is hot, but it is better than 
death—if we leave we will be killed.”
Apon
Malakal PoC Site
Shilluk elder
Top: playtime reflects wartime, a child in Malakal PoC site makes a toy soldier from mud and clay. © IOM 2015 Photo: Brendan Bannon
Bottom: with a population over 120,000 IDPs, Bentiu is one of South Sudan’s largest towns. © IOM 2016 Photo: Muse Mohammed
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Complications Facing PoC Sites
Rule of Law
One of the most unique and unprecedented consequences 
of hosting IDPs in a UN base is the application of rule of 
law, which has inevitably resulted in several challenges and 
dilemmas. Without an executive mandate, the UN cannot set 
up courts itself, while turning over accused criminals to the 
government raises significant concerns regarding the principle 
of non-refoulement.44 If UNPOL is to hand over alleged 
criminals to the Government, then they must know that 
the alleged criminals will not be targeted or treated unfairly 
because of their ethnicity or perceived political alliances. 
Considering that most the IDPs in the PoC sites are either 
of Nuer or Shilluk ethnicity, who are primarily aligned with 
the opposition, turning over perpetrators to the government 
justice system carries certain risks and can only be done 
in rare cases. There is also a risk of perpetrators being 
prematurely released by the police, undermining the entire 
justice process. Camp leaders in Juba alleged that a few 
notorious repeat offenders, handed over to the South Sudan 
Police Service were released shortly after and returned to 
the PoC site.45 As other papers have already examined many 
of these legal challenges, this report will instead focus on 
IDPs perceptions of the rule of law in the camps, including 
some of the challenges related to the Informal Mitigation and 
Dispute Resolution Mechanism (IMDRM).46
Customary Courts
The majority of court cases in the PoC sites are civil cases, 
not criminal, and these are not usually resolved by the UN 
but by customary courts within the camps. Customary 
court systems are used in tandem with statutory law in 
South Sudan and chiefs resolve the majority of intra-ethnic 
cases.47 Much of the fighting and conflict within the camps 
arises from social issues, which the customary courts are 
not allowed to enforce as they would outside the camps, as 
issues such as adultery and pregnancy are not recognized 
by the UN as legal grounds to detain. Most commonly in 
customary courts, compensation is agreed in the form of 
cattle or money, even in cases such as murder, for the family 
of the victim.48 The customary court system is recognized 
and accepted by the population in the PoC sites, so UNPOL 
relies on a similar system for solving minor cases through 
IMDRM. In the PoC sites, the IMDRM is used to settle most 
of the low-level cases, including thefts, fights and domestic 
disputes (Interview 16).
Customary court chiefs, who held the same position prior 
to the crisis, often fulfil this dispute resolution role in the 
camps. As only a few people in the PoC sites are able to pay 
compensations in cattle, payments are usually made in the 
form of cash or it is deferred. People collect contributions 
from their extended family in the PoC sites, but, if a person 
fails to bring in the sufficient amount, the court chief will 
keep a record of the deferred compensation, keeping one 
copy for themselves and giving the other to the victim’s 
family. In this way, the compensation can be settled when 
the conflict is over and people have returned to their home 
areas (Interviews 7, 23, 34, 39, 43, 58, 59, 60).
Disputes also commonly arise over domestic issues, 
including adultery and elopements. If unresolved, such cases 
frequently lead to tensions and even violent clashes between 
the concerned families and clans. The customary court 
plays an important role in settling these cases. For example, 
among Dinka IDPs in the Malakal PoC site, if a woman is 
found pregnant out of wedlock, the father of the child must 
pay five cows compensation to the woman’s family. Often, 
the man will then begin the process for marriage. 
In cases of adultery, the man must pay eight cows.49 For 
young men who do not have enough cattle or money to 
pay for bride wealth, or believe the bride’s family does not 
approve of him, one solution is to elope with the woman and 
then send his family to negotiate on his behalf. The man and 
woman will hide from her family to prevent beatings until a 
settlement is reached, usually ten cows as compensation 
and an additional forty cows in future instalments. What all 
these cases have in common is the perception of women as 
the “property” of her family.  Compensation is necessary if 
she has been “wronged” as her “value” is compromised as 
her family will receive less for her when she is married (i.e. 
in terms of bride wealth). As one respondent explained, “the 
owner of the girl” will beat a man who gets her pregnant if 
they find him before the settlement (Interview 58). Outside the 
PoC sites, similar situations will lead to detainment, while the 
family collects the settled compensation. Not surprisingly, 
although socially accepted in many communities, these 
social practices are not recognized by the UN. 
As the UN does not recognize pre-marital sex, elopement, 
adultery or pregnancy as illegal, UNPOL does not involve 
themselves in these social or domestic disputes. The court 
chiefs in all four major camps identified this issue as the 
primary cause of conflict in the PoC sites. As the family 
members of the women often seek to carry out revenge 
Lessons Learned from South Sudan Protection of Civilian Sites - Complications Facing PoC Sites - 
The principle of non-refoulement was first found in Article 33 para. 1 of the 1951 United 
Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and is defined as: “1. No Contracting 
State shall expel or return (“refouler”) a refugee in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers 
of territories where his life or freedom would be threatened on account of his race, religion, 
nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion.”
UNPOL confirmed that if they knew of such perpetrators returning to the PoC they would deny 
them entry. However, UNPOL was not aware whether perpetrators that had been handed to the 
Government were back in the PoC site or not.
F. McCrone, 2015.
D. Deng, Challenges of Accountability: An Assessment of Dispute Resolution Processes in 
Rural South Sudan (Juba, South Sudan Law Society, March 2013).
Compensation for murder is anthropologically known as blood wealth.
The definition of adultery is broad and also includes pre-marital sex, although this is a 
cheaper fine. 
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against the man and his relatives if compensation is not 
paid or while the court process is still ongoing, the court 
chiefs have requested these young men to be detained or 
held in custody for their own safety until compensation is 
agreed (Interviews 7, 23, 34, 43, 59, 60). However, as the 
UN only deals with criminal cases, these social disputes are 
not considered legal grounds to detain someone, which the 
chiefs claim lead to much of the violence within the camps.
Court chiefs in the Bentiu PoC site complained that, as 
they have no power to arrest or detain, they are reduced to 
being “advisors” (Interview 34). Since the UN will not detain 
offenders in social cases, they have had difficulties in terms 
of preventing fights between families and clans. UNPOL 
instead attempts to engage with community leaders to 
prevent the breakout of violence, but changing decades old 
culture practice is a huge task, much less doing so in IDP 
camps in the middle of a war. However, ignoring customary 
court norms also creates opportunities for conflict that could 
be prevented. The complexity in this situation is recognized 
by many UNPOL staff members, and there are no easy 
solutions to this dilemma.
Community Watch Group
Before the creation of the PoC sites in December 2013, 
UNPOL’s mandate focused on building the capacity of the 
national police service. However, following the arrival of IDPs 
into UNMISS bases, the safety of the UNMISS staff and the 
IDPs suddenly became a major concern and UNPOL’s role 
changed (Interviews 55, 78). There was now an imminent 
need to mitigate crimes and create order in the PoC sites. 
However, many UNPOL staff members who had been 
brought in as trainers of the police were not experienced or 
prepared to establish rule of law among thousands of people 
within a UN base, particularly without an executive mandate 
(Interviews 13, 18, 55, 78, 98). 
The influx of IDPs also meant that UNPOL personnel did 
not have adequate numbers of staff to police the sites 
on their own. In a bid to improve security within the PoC 
sites, Community Watch Groups (CWG) were established 
to assist with self-policing in the camps and to supplement 
UNPOL. Working with volunteers from the community 
itself improved the ability of UNPOL to mitigate crime, and, 
according to UNPOL staff members, crime rates are currently 
comparatively low considering the relatively high number of 
IDPs and low number of police in the PoC sites (Interview 55). 
The use of volunteer police has also led to a number of 
challenges. The CWGs comprise volunteers, with no income 
or training in policing or human rights. There was no gender 
mainstreaming initially, so the number of women involved 
was very low or non-existent (Interviews 18, 78).50 Some 
respondents believed the focus on creating order in some 
locations limited the engagement between UNPOL and the 
CWGs, which were given a level of independence to manage 
basic issues themselves (Interview 68). Much like community 
defence groups outside the camps, the youth monitored and 
dealt with minor cases alone.51
However, the varied levels of independence of CWGs also 
led to abuses by members or the use of negative cultural 
practices, such as beatings of alleged perpetrators. Some 
abused their positions by beating or detaining people 
themselves rather than turning them over to UNPOL 
(Interviews 13, 18, 55, 78, 98). In one case, young boys were 
held in a container in the sun for several days (Interview 68). 
In the UN House PoC site, the CWG has been accused of 
abusing its power by collecting “taxes” from traders and 
local NGO staff for its own benefit (Interviews 68, 78). A 
ledger book was found with the names of the IDPs and the 
amount they had paid to the CWG and was perceived by 
some people as an extortion racket. Reports further indicate 
that traders bringing in goods, including registered traders of 
the WFP voucher system, also have to pay taxes to the CWG 
(Interview 74). There is no clear law or policy banning taxation 
within the camps, but, with little control over the structures of 
the CWG and camp leadership, there is a fear they could be 
collecting money through the threat of violence.
Members and leaders of CWGs in the camps, on the other 
hand, complained about the lack of motivation to work long 
hours and nights with no income, incentives or equipment, 
such as torches or gumboots (Interviews 9, 13, 18, 23, 
55, 78, 98). UNPOL carried out policing and human rights 
training of CWGs, but the quality varied by location. UNPOL 
personnel are receiving training on community policing to 
ensure a level of competence and standardization (Interview 
78). The number of CWG members also varies significantly 
among PoC sites. The Community Police Unit based in Juba 
has created guidelines and standards for the use of CWG 
units in the PoC sites, but, as of the end of 2015, they had 
not been put in place outside of Juba (Interview 78).
CWGs have been a useful tool in mitigating crimes in the 
camps but run the risk of abusing positions of power if not 
carefully monitored and trained. The success of the CWGs 
depends much on the quality of UNPOL staff and their 
personal relationships with youth in the camps. Replacement 
of individuals within the CWG could have an adverse effect 
on security and crime in the camps. The community policing 
guidelines established in Juba should be used in all the 
PoC sites to guarantee certain standards, no matter the 
personnel. One of the major security threats facing the PoC 
sites comes from active combatants who stay in the PoC 
sites or use them as a temporary safe haven.
The newest extension in Malakal has selected women for half of their CWG, but this is a rarity. I.M. Breidlid and M.J. Arensen, “Demystifying the White Army: Nuer armed civilians’ 
involvement in the South Sudanese Crisis.” Conflict Trends Issue 3, 2014, pp. 32–38.
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Camp Leadership Structures
From the beginning of the conflict, there was a clear need for 
creating order in the PoC sites as the IDP population rapidly 
grew. Some locations, such as Malakal, were completely 
chaotic in the early days of the crisis. IDPs were sleeping 
wherever they could find space, with little organization or 
separation from the UNMISS staff offices or residences. 
In order to organize services and manage the IDPs, it was 
decided that leadership structures needed to be set up. 
The variations between the camps meant that there was 
no common way of setting up camp leadership structures 
across all the sites. Instead, the IDPs themselves or UNMISS 
Civil Affairs attempted to create structures, with various 
degrees of success. Initially, leaders were selected by being 
interested in the position or based on their positions before 
the conflict; but, these qualifications did not necessarily 
translate to successful representation of IDPs and their 
interests. After some difficulties with the initial leaders, such 
as the Elders Council in Malakal, camp leadership structures 
became based on more representative considerations. 
With the exception of Malakal, the IDP populations in the 
PoCs sites are largely Nuer, and, so the authority structures 
often mirror the chieftain system found outside the sites.52 
Despite variations, the camp leadership structures in all four 
major camps53 are currently organized around two criteria: 
places of origin and location in the camp. With the exception 
of Juba, most of the IDPs’ “places of origin” are in the states 
of the PoC site where they live. Leaders are selected by ethnic 
group, region or clan for the highest levels of representation, 
such as the inter-ethnic Peace and Security Council (PSC) 
in Malakal, or the Camp Management Committee (CMC) 
in UN House. While zones and blocks also have selected 
leaders, the top leadership posts in every camp are selected 
due to place of origin and represent a clan, region or ethnic 
group. One respondent who was formerly with RRP recalled 
failed attempts to convince the IDPs that camp leadership 
responsibilities are primarily about camp location and 
services, and, therefore should only be based on locality in 
the PoC site rather than place of origin (Interview 50).
Although this is how it is done outside the camps, leadership 
along clan lines could exacerbate tensions between groups 
and prevents proper representation of women. In most the 
camps, the positions of leadership are term based, usually 
one year or six months. Some positions do not have to 
change at the end of a term if people are satisfied with 
their leadership, such as youth leaders in Bor, but most 
posts change hands and another region’s representative 
will step in.
The success of these leadership structures have varied in 
each camps, and humanitarian workers involved in camp 
management feel that they have often been over-empowered 
(Interview 68). Some individuals have used the positions as 
a means of gaining personal wealth and intimidating political 
opponents and humanitarians.54 In Juba, there has been 
violence against humanitarians and UNPOL, who have been 
chased out of the PoC site and had to renegotiate access 
(Interview 99). In Bentiu, a camp manager was kicked out and 
threatened to never return (Interview 89). Bor leadership has 
been much more supportive to the humanitarian agencies 
(Interview 68), while Malakal has the great challenge of an 
inter-ethnic leadership committee made up of 49 members. 
There is variation between the camps, as well, in terms of 
how the leadership structures function and are selected. 
Bentiu is set up with a Community High Committee, 
comprising 19 representatives from the community. Each of 
the seven counties in Unity select two representatives, while 
those not from the state are given the rights of an eighth 
county (Interview 39). In addition, three women are added 
to the 16 representatives, leading to a total of 19 people on 
the Community High Committee. Unlike other sites, Bentiu 
has positions based on particular sectors; so, in addition to 
a chairperson, deputy and secretary, the committees also 
have representatives for health, WASH, labour, education, 
food and services, vulnerable and disabled, non-food items 
(NFIs), women and security (ibid.). 
The multi-ethnic composition of the Malakal PoC is unique. 
The PSC comprises 49 members—14 from the major ethnic 
groups (Dinka, Shilluk and Nuer) and 7 for the rest (Interview 
16). As IDPs from the Shilluk ethnic group compose the 
majority of the population in the PoC site, if the council were 
based on a vote system the minority groups would have 
little representation. The PSC is also used as a means of 
mitigating conflict between the various ethnic groups due 
to varied allegiances. Camp leaders exist according to their 
location in the camp, such as blocks and sectors (ibid.). 
Bor is the smallest of the PoC sites, and its leadership 
structure is relatively small, as well. Positions are assigned 
according to the “greater” Nuer regions. The Camp Chairman 
is selected from greater Akobo, the female leader from 
greater Fangak and the youth leader from greater Bentiu 
(Interview 9). The fourth greater, Nasir, is not represented 
because the population in the PoC site is too small for Nuer 
from Upper Nile to have their own representative. 
The leadership systems used in the PoC sites are complex 
and multi-layered and ensure that every group has an 
opportunity to be represented in the various positions. 
One in-depth case study of the leadership structure of 
Juba’s Tongping PoC is detailed in the Case Studies in the 
next pages.
The composition of the camps has changed over time in some locations. 
See the camp sections and timelines for more.
  Due to the small numbers of people in Wau and Melut they are not included in this analysis. 
  See Case Study: The UN House PoC 1 “Takeover”.
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When the conflict broke out in Juba, many political and military 
elites aligned with the opposition fled to the Tongping PoC site. As a 
result, in the first few months of 2014, there were quite a few people 
who stayed in the camp and also had significant influence before the 
crisis as prominent politicians or military leaders. These elites later left 
the country, but, initially, control in the camps was better due to their 
leadership (Interviews 50, 69). This influence had both good and bad 
consequences, depending on if their interests aligned with the interests of 
UNMISS and humanitarians. However, after the top officials departed 
the camp, a power vacuum occurred as people with less influence 
competed over control (ibid.). This led to an opaque and difficult group 
of leaders whose power was largely dependent on the continuation of 
the PoC site. Not surprisingly, this was one of the factors that complicated 
the closure of Tongping. Even once the IDPs relocated from Tongping to 
UN House, their leadership structures remained the same.
At the UN House PoC site, the CMC includes five executives, each 
representing a number of counties. There are four “greater” areas 
among the Nuer of South Sudan: Akobo, Fangak, Nasir and Bentiu 
(Interviews 41, 44). Greater Akobo, Fangak and Nasir are all made 
up of three counties each, while Greater Bentiu has seven counties, 
so instead receives two representatives. The clan or clans that make 
up each greater area55 vote and select a leader to represent their 
region in the executive committee (ibid.). Sub-clans select who they 
want to have as their candidate and then the entire region selects the 
representative together. It is important to note that the positions in the 
executive committee assigned to each region are changed every term, 
which is currently six months. Another group, the Council of Elders, 
including three representatives from each of the 16 counties, or 48 in 
total, decides which regions will represent which position for each term 
(ibid.). This rotation ensures that every region will have the opportunity to 
have a representative in each post. The executive committee comprises 
a chairperson, deputy, finance officer, secretary and information officer. 
In addition to the executive of the CMC, there are also representatives for 
each zone and each block in the Juba PoC site, and the positions are not 
term limited. There are nine zones, with six to eight blocks each. The blocks 
vary in size from 80 to 140 households, and people are mixed from each 
of the greater regions (ibid.). Each block has six representatives: the same 
five posts as the executive with an additional women’s representative. There 
is also a Women’s Association and a Nuer Youth Union, which have eight 
positions of leadership each and advise the executive committee (ibid.). 
The many layers of leadership and term limits are a means of holding the 
leaders accountable and ensuring everyone has representation. Currently, 
there is discussion of adding another “count,” which would represent all 
those from other parts of the country who live in the PoC site, such as IDPs 
from Shilluk (Interviews 41, 44).
Case Study
Juba Tongping and UN House PoC Sites
- Complications Facing PoC Sites
UN House PoC
Tongping
Airport
White Nile
Juba Town Map
PoC Site UNMISS
JubaCentral Equatoria
Some areas are comprised of one Nuer clan (i.e. Greater Akobo is Lou Nuer, Greater Nasir is Jikany) 
while others are mixed (Greater Bentiu and Greater Fangak include many Nuer subgroups).
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Timeline: Tongping and UN House PoC Sites Population Trend
2014 2015
Relocation activities span 
from July 2014–January 
2015.
3. Tomping PoC site closed 
and IDPs relocated to UN 
House PoC sites
4. UN House PoC site II 
residents relocated to 
PoC site III and PoC site 
II is closed. Verification of 
IDPs in PoC site I results 
in a significant population 
decrease from 13,000 to 
7,000.
5. Foreign nationals  return to 
areas of habitual residence.
1. UN House PoC site II 
opened. Relocation of 
1,500 Tongping PoC site 
residents to PoC site II 
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UNMISS soldiers prepare the relocation convoy that will travel from Tongping to UN House. © IOM 2014 Photo: Martin Legasse
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With few options for work in the PoC site, most residents depend on humanitarian support. © IOM 2015 Photo: Brendan Bannon
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The leadership in one section of the UN House PoC site, known as 
PoC 1, was selected by the IDPs themselves at a community meeting 
shortly after arriving on 19 December 2013. At that time, it was unclear 
if NGOs or the UN were going to provide services, and people 
were fighting over space and needed some means of organizing 
themselves, so they set up blocks within the camp (Interview 73). As 
the first leaders in the camp, there were rumours that they received 
salaries from NGOs. Despite denial from the leaders, “rumours spread 
quickly in the crisis” and persisted (Interviews 73, 75). After nine 
months, IDPs decided they wanted to select new representatives from 
another “greater” area. The first chairman was from Unity, and the next 
was selected from greater Akobo (ibid.). Towards the end of 2014, 
WFP was pushing to replace general food distributions with a voucher 
system in which people use their vouchers to buy food from traders; this 
served as a catalyst for the change in leadership that occurred (ibid.). 
Rumours quickly spread that the implementation of a voucher system 
would give Dinka traders the opportunity to poison the food. In 
addition to the rumour that leadership were receiving salaries from 
NGOs, stories were told to the media that the current leadership 
was supporting the “questionable” voucher system. Doubt regarding 
the leadership grew (Interviews 73, 75). One former leader believes 
that others who wanted to compete for the position of camp chairman, 
including youth leaders and the eventual successor, Hoth, encouraged 
these rumours as a means of undermining the leadership. Hoth, who 
claimed he would stand up to the NGOs and stop implementation 
of the new voucher system, was selected to be the new chairman 
(ibid.). Hoth explained that it was all due to a crisis in leadership over 
the voucher system (ibid.). Either way, for four months, no food was 
distributed and eventually an ultimatum was given: either the IDPs 
use local Nuer traders, outside traders or WFP traders. The people 
selected local Nuer traders who go out and buy the food from people 
they trust. Despite the promises to stop the voucher system, it was finally 
implemented (ibid.).
The change in leadership to Hoth led to a significant power shift in 
the camp itself. The youth, via the CWG, gained considerable power 
under Hoth and began to be used as tax collectors for the camp 
leadership (Interview 74). Chairman Hoth admits that the leadership 
taxes NGO workers who are IDPs and live in the camp but claims 
they use the taxes for administrative purposes to support the community 
watch group, the same group that collects the tax (Interview 75). Many 
IDPs view the taxes an example of abuse of power (Interview 74, 99). 
In addition to taxing local NGO staff salaries, the CWG also tax the 
traders involved in the voucher system or those bringing goods into the 
camp (Interview 74). How much of these taxes go to the pockets of the 
leadership and how much is spent on CWG costs is unclear. Chairman 
Hoth claims some of the money goes to the families of the CWG, 
while the rest is used for “running costs” of the CWG (Interview 75). 
With no clear rules regarding camp leadership’s ability to tax IDPs, 
the taxation cannot be stopped, leading to many questions about the 
potential abuse of power in these situations.
Case Study
The UN House PoC Site "Takeover"
UN House PoC site, September 2015 / Population: 28,000 IDPs.
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As early as January 2014, President Kiir accused UNMISS 
of running a “parallel government” and protecting rebels and 
weapons in the PoC sites.56 The accusation originated due 
to the presence of several high-profile Nuer politicians and 
military commanders in the Juba PoC sites at the beginning 
of the conflict. Most of the high profile IDPs in Juba later 
left the PoC sites, and UNMISS took steps to preserve the 
civilian character of the bases through frequent weapon 
searches. The confiscated weapons and uniforms were not 
turned over to the SPLA as demanded, and the Government 
of South Sudan has continued to accuse UNMISS of lacking 
impartiality and even arming the rebels. High profile incidents, 
including the overland transport of weapons by the Ghanaian 
Battalion in March 2014 and the confiscation of 55,000 litres 
of petrol and seven weapons from UNMISS transport boats 
in Upper Nile in October 2015 by SPLA-IO allied forces, 
have exacerbated this perception and increased animosity 
between UNMISS and the Government.57
One of the principal challenges in maintaining the civilian 
character of the PoC sites is the existence of former 
combatants in the sites. It was 18 months into the conflict 
before UNMISS created guidelines regarding the arrival of 
armed combatants, and decision-making is still, to a great 
extent, left to UNMISS state leadership. UNMISS’s position is 
that if an armed combatant takes off his uniform and hands 
over his weapon, then he is considered to be a civilian and 
treated like any other new arrival to the camps (Interview 50). 
Humanitarian actors have pushed for a reintegration 
process to be carried out for new arrivals, which has 
only just recently begun in Malakal (Interviews 29, 50). 
Disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) 
was removed from the UNMISS mandate in May 2014. 
However, reintegration without demobilization creates 
many complications. DDR programmes in South Sudan 
have not been successful in the past, such as during the 
CPA implementation period, despite significant funding and 
established institutions involving the concerned parties, i.e. 
the governments of Sudan and South Sudan. DDR in the 
current, politicized environment is premature. Unless the 
Transitional Government of National Unity (TGoNU), when 
formed, is politically supportive of the DDR process, it is 
likely to once more be an expensive and difficult prospect.
According to a senior UNMISS staff member, identifying a 
military combatant from an armed civilian in South Sudan 
is extremely complex and beyond the ability of the mission 
(Interview 50). As seen in the current conflict, as well as 
during the second civil war and post-CPA period, armed 
civilians are frequently mobilized for political violence, 
blurring the distinction between civilians and the military.58 
Rather than running the risk of turning away people who 
might get killed as a consequence, UNMISS would rather 
risk having a few active combatants in its bases (Interviews 
15, 16, 50). While identifying former combatants in South 
Sudan would be a very difficult task, there should be a 
distinction between armed civilians and soldiers who “self-
identify” by coming to the bases in uniforms (Interviews 
11, 68). UNMISS in Malakal have, for instance, recently 
begun separately identifying combatants upon arrival for 
reintegration into the PoC community. They are taught 
about their responsibilities as civilians in the PoC site and 
receive medical treatment as required (Interview 16). Some 
UNMISS staff members, however, expressed concerns 
over the potential risks associated with separating former 
combatants from the civilians, making them potential 
targets for the civilian population inside the camp and the 
opposing forces outside (Interviews 16, 50). 
Many of the humanitarians interviewed were, on the other 
hand, worried about how active combatants, in the absence 
of a demobilization programme, could abuse the PoC 
sites as a means of temporary safety, increase security 
risks within the camp and severely reduce the civilian 
character of the PoC sites (Interviews 5, 11, 68). When 
the SPLA-IO-aligned Shilluk commander Olony launched 
offensives on Malakal town, hundreds of Shilluk youth in 
the PoC site mobilized to take part in the armed conflict 
(Interviews 5, 11). When the SPLA retook the town, the 
youth returned back to the PoC site for safety, hiding their 
weapons outside the perimeter. While this incident clearly 
was problematic, it further illustrates UNMISS’s argument 
regarding the difficulties of making distinctions between 
military combatants and armed civilians.
Another example from Malakal PoC seems more 
straightforward. In April 2015, when heavy fighting erupted 
in Malakal, SPLA reinforcement troops from the Equatoria 
region fled to the Malakal PoC site for safety (Interview 15). 
An Equatorian SPLA soldier, captured by Olony’s men, was 
escorted to UNMISS as they claimed they had no problems 
with the Equatorians (ibid.). Another 26 SPLA soldiers ran to 
the Rwandan Battalion at the airport when fighting broke out 
as they were new to the area and did not know where the 
UNMISS base was located (ibid.). Eventually, after the SPLA 
recaptured Malakal, the former combatants re-joined the 
military (ibid.). If the PoC sites, especially Malakal, continue 
to serve as a place of temporary sanctuary for combatants 
of both sides of the conflict, then there is a great risk that 
the sites will become a target for the warring parties. The 
attacks on the Akobo, Bor and Malakal PoC sites are stark 
illustrations of the possibilities of such a scenario. 
Even though UNMISS does carry out disarmament upon 
arrival and attempts to reintegrate combatants, ensuring 
the civilian character of the PoC sites is not feasible without 
demobilization. The main risks to the civilian character of 
the PoC sites is actually from armed civilians using them as 
a refuge, rather than soldiers in uniform. These civilians, or 
local defence groups, commonly comprising all physically fit 
males, are not part of formal military structures and cannot 
be so easily identified for a demobilisation or reintegration 
programme.59 Other solutions should be considered to 
reduce the engagement of IDPs staying in the PoC with 
the conflict outside. Messages of reconciliation are likely to 
fall on deaf ears as the conflict continues, and restricting 
movement during periods of conflict poses other risks. There 
are no easy solutions, but it is clear the issue of maintaining 
the civilian character and impartiality of the PoC sites faces 
immense challenges in the current political climate.
Challenges of Neutrality, 
Demobilization and Reintegration 
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Space Issues  
One of the main tensions between humanitarians and 
UNMISS is over space, or the lack thereof, within the bases. 
UNMISS bases were not constructed to host thousands, 
much less tens of thousands, of people. The land given by 
the Sudanese government to UNMIS 1 was often swampy 
areas and prone to flooding in the rainy season.  The sudden 
influx of thousands of people into areas with limited space 
caused immediate congestion of IDPs and humanitarians; 
the solutions comprised containment, expansion and 
designation of service areas with or without standards.  
Expansions of the base perimeters required an agreement 
between UNMISS leadership and the Government, as 
well as permission from the owner to lease the land. Each 
PoC site location faced different challenges in terms of 
expansion.  Such a process requires additional resources 
for construction, such as heavy machinery and perimeter 
materials. The time required by UNMISS to redirect limited 
resources to the perimeters led some locations to have 
extremely inadequate boundaries until other partners 
stepped in to complete the work. In June 2014, UNMISS 
announced that any new land allocation or expansions of 
PoC sites would require approval from Juba (Interview 68). 
Despite reservations by mission leadership, pressure from 
former DSRSG/RC/HC Lanzer and donors eventually led to 
the expansion and decongestion of the camps (ibid.).
In Juba’s Tongping, the IDPs were contained to an area with 
4 m2 per person, far below international standards of 45 
m2 per person.59 Finding space for latrines and distribution 
points became extremely challenging. The driest parts of the 
bases were already used by UNMISS for accommodation 
and offices, leaving highly dense populations on land 
vulnerable to flooding for two thirds of the year. The solution 
to decongest was the creation of a large area at UN House. 
Construction began in early 2014 but was not completed 
until June, with the relocation exercise taking another six 
months. Tongping stayed congested for almost one year, 
with literally no humanitarian standards achieved.   
 
As UNMISS leadership did not have an interest in increasing 
the pull factor to the PoC sites, it allegedly sought to 
limit the services offered by INGOs. For example, one 
organization, reportedly, infuriated UNMISS leadership 
by creating a child friendly space in UN House as it was 
perceived to create an additional draw factor (Interview 
47). Former camp managers also argued that UNMISS was 
reluctant to allocate additional space for the PoC sites, as 
improvements would potentially increase the appeal of the 
camps. The IDPs were often located on very congested 
parts of land, adjacent to empty spaces UNMISS had 
set aside for developing their bases. Dozens of new staff 
residences were being built in UN House while IDPs had 
only 3.5 m2 per person in parts of the PoC site (ibid.). 
Further negotiations with UNMISS over land required for 
humanitarian hubs were, according to many humanitarian 
staff, protracted and challenging, as well.
Malakal expansion was the first area created by UNMISS 
and humanitarians to accommodate all IDPs sheltering at a 
PoC site.  A large area was identified on the southern edge 
of the base. The original creation of the PoC extensions 
did not consider international standards, increasing 
public health and protection challenges in particular. In 
the Malakal PoC site, staff members of UNMISS Mission 
Support Unit claimed they were only informed about these 
standards after the first expansion area had already been 
built and were told that the space created was only enough 
for 30 per cent of the IDPs within the base. In the end, the 
majority of IDPs moved to the new site with less than 12 
m2 per person. Additional sections were built afterwards by 
humanitarian organizations to further decongest the site. 
Many of the IDPs are interested in finding additional income 
to supplement the services offered by the humanitarians. 
Women often sell firewood and grass they collect from 
outside the PoC at great personal risk, while others have 
started small business in the PoC sites. For most IDPs, 
markets are currently the only means of livelihoods and 
income, and competition over market space in the PoC sites 
can become intense and even result in conflicts (Interview 
68). A large market in Malakal PoC site was removed and 
moved to the town when security conditions were better and 
as a means of encouraging returns. However, the eruption 
of armed clashes in April 2015 destroyed this market.
Current security conditions do not allow for a new market 
to be rebuilt or accessed by the majority of IDPs in the 
Malakal PoC site. As a result, shopkeepers have set up their 
shops within the site where they can find space, and there 
is a constant battle to break down the illegal construction of 
shops along access roads. At one point, latrines in a sector 
could not be emptied of waste because of a series of illegal 
buildings blocking access. UNMISS forces have refused to 
expand the perimeter to include an expanded market space 
in Malakal as they perceived this to be beyond their mandate 
of protecting civilians (Interview 57). The subsequent events 
in Malakal in February 2016 have proven that congestion 
of PoC sites increases tensions and prevents key services 
from functioning. 
However, as the recent inflow of IDPs in Bentiu and Malakal 
has surpassed any expectations, camp management has 
yet to decongest the majority PoC sites to meet international 
standards. In Bentiu, the PoC site was extended during 
the 2015 dry season to 1.5 million m2 to improve living 
conditions. Between March and December 2015, Bentiu 
received more than 70,000 new arrivals, more than doubling 
the population of the site. In some PoC sites, IDPs still have 
less than 4 m2 of space per person even after two years.
BBC News, 21 January 2014. “South Sudan President Salva Kiir hits out at UN,” 21 January 2014.
BBC News, 10 March 2014. “South Sudan protest against UN over arms cache,” 10 March 
2014; UNMISS, “UNMISS secures the safe release of all personnel held by SPLA-IO in Upper 
Nile State,” 1 November 2015.
I.M. Breidlid and M.J. Arensen, 2014, pp. 32–38.
45 m2 per person might seem like a large amount of space, but it includes the space 
needed for services such as latrines, distribution points, medical facilities, schools and even 
roads and drainage.
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After walking for several days an elderly woman and her grandson arrive at the Bentiu PoC site. © IOM 2015 Photo: Brendan Bannon
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PoC Exit Strategies
Almost immediately following the creation of the PoC 
sites, there have been constant questions over the exit 
strategy for the sites and returns of IDPs. As pointed out 
by current DSRSG/RC/HC Eugene Owusu, while UNMISS 
undoubtedly did the right thing by opening the gates and 
creating the PoCs, they are not sustainable and at some 
stage the international community has to think about a 
durable solution. As stated in a July 2014 report from the 
UN Secretary-General, “Sites for the protection of civilians 
in UNMISS bases are not a sustainable solution for the 
internally displaced persons who are being protected there 
[…] it is therefore imperative that sustainable immediate, 
medium-term and long-term solutions and resources be 
found to assist the internally displaced.”60  The risks the 
mission faces, both real and perceived, by hosting IDP 
camps in their bases have meant that there has significant 
interest within the mission in closing them down as soon 
as possible. Discussions over alternatives to the PoC sites 
began as soon as it was clear that IDPs were not leaving after 
the planned 72-hour period. In 2014, the discussion over 
solutions to the PoC site “problem” considered a number 
of options. Three major alternatives were contemplated 
(Interview 42):
Internal Displaced Persons could
•	Voluntarily return to their homes or areas of origin
•	Voluntary resettle to another part of South Sudan
•	Seek asylum in other countries
It was assumed that IDPs could voluntarily leave the country, 
which some did on their own accord, or UNMISS could 
relocate the IDPs to newly built camps outside the bases. 
These camps would be run by a civilian agency, such as 
UNHCR or IOM, which traditionally manage refugee and IDP 
camps. Although this idea reached high-level talks, it was 
eventually dismissed due to security concerns (ibid.). Any 
new camps would not fall within the current SOFA between 
UNMISS and the Government of South Sudan, and, without 
the same jurisdiction, civilian agencies could not deny entry 
of security forces into the camps. Hence, the IDPs would be 
at greater risk, opening the potential of a scenario similar to 
what happened Rwanda. Considering that the attacks on the 
Akobo, Bor and Malakal bases occurred despite UN military 
presence, this possibility could not be dismissed. 
The simplest option was chosen to begin at the end of 
2014: the facilitation of voluntary returns for IDPs to other 
locations in country. Agencies planned for this to occur in 
the following dry season and carried out intention surveys 
and assessments of potential areas of return (Interview 
2). The focus for the returns was on the PoC sites in Bor 
and Wau due to their relatively small populations, which 
were less than 3,000 IDPs combined. Akobo, Leer and 
Pagak were considered for potential areas of return, as 
they were deemed to be stable locations at that time.61 
IDPs were offered assistance to return to their preferred 
location rather than staying at the PoC sites, an offer which 
interested very many IDPs. Several details proved difficult 
to address, such as the limited number of belongings 
IDPs could bring with them, where IDPs would be settled 
upon arrival, food security conditions in the locations 
and determining the level of services that IDPs would 
they receive in the areas of return.62 Only a week before 
the movements were to begin, the Government of South 
Sudan blocked the relocations based on fears that the men 
from the PoC sites could reinforce opposition forces if they 
returned to SPLA-IO areas (ibid.).
At the end of 2015, the discussion was focused on three 
potential solutions: transferring IDPs to another location, 
encouraging the voluntary movement of IDPs to other 
places with the offer of continued services and shifting 
the security support so the IDPs could be located outside 
UNMISS perimeters. Relocating IDPs to a location managed 
by civilians and where greater services are offered is largely 
dependent upon whether the IDPs feel safe enough to 
voluntarily move outside UNMISS bases to places where 
the SOFA agreement is not applicable. It is likely this would 
only be a viable option when the TGoNU is put in place, 
with integrated security forces from both SPLA and SPLA-
IO. Even if these conditions are met, new bases are unlikely 
to be created due to the high costs involved (Interview 68). 
Encouraging the voluntary relocation of IDPs to secure 
locations is already occurring, such as to Wau Shilluk near 
the Malakal PoC site (Interview 57). This is a solution for IDPs 
who have moved to the PoC sites primarily due to a lack of 
services but feel security is constant enough to move outside 
the PoC sites if those services are provided elsewhere. 
Returns will also depend on stable humanitarian services 
and security. If these conditions are not met, the risk of IDPs 
returning to the PoC sites is high. The most likely scenario is 
the reduction of the official perimeter of the UNMISS bases 
to exclude the IDPs. UNMISS would still be responsible for 
providing necessary security, but as the IDP camps would be 
outside official UN base perimeters, the physical risks for the 
IDPs would increase. In the past two years, most IDPs have 
been moved and now live outside the original perimeters of 
the bases. In addition, buffer zones and fences already exist 
between UNMISS and IDPs in some PoC sites, like PoC 3 in 
UN House. Due to the challenges of returns, this seems to 
be the most likely scenario (Interview 79).
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In 2015 Leer would become one of the areas most affected by conflict, but at the time of the 
discussions it was still relatively stable. 
Akobo was the most popular destination and the local government promised to set aside land 
for the IDPs to settle on. However, it was unclear where this land was contested between 
the Anuak and Lou Nuer. The two ethnic groups have been clashing over land ownership in 
Akobo since the early 1980s and the 2013 conflict divided their loyalties. As Anuak fled the 
county due to the current conflict there was a distinct risk the IDPs could be settled on the 
"empty" land they claim to be their own and exacerbate long-term conflict between the groups 
upon their return. For more see: M. Arensen, Historical Grievances and Fragile Agreements: An 
Analysis of Local Conflict Dynamics in Akobo (South Sudan Humanitarian Project, Juba, 2015).
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There are likely to be very different opinions between 
stakeholders as to the risks IDPs face by closing the PoC 
sites and which conditions are necessary for safe returns. 
Some in UNMISS already feel that Juba has been secure 
enough for IDPs to return since mid-2014, while IDPs claim 
they still feel at risk. Whether this option will be applicable 
before the implementation of the TGoNU and integrated 
security forces is debatable, as dozens of IDPs identified 
these processes as primary indicators for their perception 
of safety and security. The relocation of IDPs in Juba in 
2014 and the closing of a section UN House PoC in 2015 
are excellent examples of the challenges that will arise when 
the closure of the PoC sites becomes a reality.
Relocation to UN House PoC Site and
Closure of Tongping
Hosting more than 20,000 IDPs in Tongping PoC site led to 
immense challenges for all stakeholders. Space for the IDPs 
was as small as 4 m2 per person and, as Tongping is not 
on high or rocky ground, rains easily led to flooding. It was 
decided by UNMISS to move the IDPs to another location. 
When they realized the rains were coming, as expansion 
of Tongping PoC site was not an option. The Chinese 
government helped negotiate the release of the land and 
the Chinese community in Juba prepared the land for the 
UN House extension. In the new site, IDPs could live on 
higher, drier ground and have five times the space they had 
in Tongping. After the space was created, humanitarians 
built shelters in order to convince people to move in June 
2014. Camp leaders were brought to the site from Tongping 
to show them the location so they could encourage others 
to relocate. A small group moved right away as they were 
living in flooded areas of Tongping; however, the majority of 
people were fearful of relocating. 
Rumours started to spread regarding the purpose of the 
relocation, where some IDPs believed NGOs moved the 
IDPs to SPLA bases to be killed. Some IDPs preferred to 
live near the centre of town as they could leave the PoC 
site and quickly return if there were any security risks. The 
main fear arose from potential targeting by the government 
and the fact that the Chinese built the site due to the close 
relationship between the governments of South Sudan and 
China. In Tongping, office containers and UN civilian staff 
surrounded the IDPs, while in UN House PoC site there was 
a ditch and berm with a chain link fence protecting them from 
any aggressors outside. As SPLA had shot into the Tongping 
base in the past, people feared that this would happen again 
in UN House without any protection from UNMISS.63 
One camp leader also identified mistrust in NGOs regarding 
their perceived neutrality as they can only work in South 
Sudan with the permission of the government. In particular, 
some mistrusted national NGO staff coming from the 
outside, as they believe they were government spies and 
might collect information, such as photos and videos, of the 
IDPs. The encouragement by NGOs to relocate the IDPs to 
UN House reinforced their suspicions. 
IDP leaders further used the relocation in pursuance of 
their own agenda, reinforcing rumours that the IDPs were 
being moved to UN House to be killed and that the NGOs 
and UN were paid to relocate them by the Government 
(Interview 44). Some leaders insisted they keep the same 
blocks as they had in Tongping to ensure they stayed in 
power (Interview 69). Leaders who encouraged relocation, 
or moved themselves, were consequently replaced by 
others who strongly opposed it (Interviews 44, 50, 69). 
The frequent changes in leadership made it more difficult 
for UNMISS and NGOs to establish confidence and 
relationships with the leadership. One INGO manager 
working in Tongping believed that the IDPs were often 
initially positive to relocate to UN House, but it was the 
leadership, or those with informal influence directing the 
leadership representatives, that created roadblocks for the 
process to succeed (Interview 69). 
By August 2014, more rain arrived. While Tongping was 
flooded, UN House was dry, convincing thousands of 
IDPs to move. In September, UNMISS began to forcefully 
dismantle empty structures in Tongping, leading to serious 
resentment among the IDPs and prompting an assault on 
humanitarians and RRP on 29 September (Interview 44).64 
Camp leaders detained national INGO staff and equipment 
that had been promoting the move to UN House, saying it 
was “for their own protection” although it was an obvious 
means of intimidation (Interview 69). The dismantling of 
shelters prompted another 10,000 people to relocate, 
leaving only 3,000–4,000 people in the Tongping PoC site 
by mid-December (Interview 44).
By this time, the remaining population had selected a third 
group of leaders who were resolutely against the relocation. 
Food services were stopped in November in Tongping and 
IDPs were informed they would continue in UN House. SPLA 
were stationed outside the Tongping gates, which stopped 
IDPs from being able to freely move in and out of the site 
in December.65 Without food distribution, or the ability to 
buy food outside the PoC, the resolve of the remaining 
people finally ended and they were moved before Christmas 
(Interview 44). By the time the last few thousand IDPs 
arrived in UN House, they had the last selection of shelters 
and people consequently blamed the Tongping leadership 
for delaying their relocation and leaving them with the least 
desirable shelters. These individuals were not selected for 
the UN House leadership.
Although overall the IDPs now prefer UN House PoC site 3, one evening in September 2015 
four IDPs were actually wounded after shooting into UN House PoC site 3. 
There is significant debate regarding the dismantling of shelters as a tactic for the closure 
of Tongping. Management felt it was justified, as most dismantled shelters were empty, or 
were in dangerous locations for the occupants. Occupied shelters were only dismantled if 
the people had another location to move and protection actors were involved. On the other 
hand, IDPs and protection actors claimed the process was not always done in a dignified 
way, which created significant grievances towards humanitarians and UNMISS.  
The SPLA were reportedly stationed outside the Tongping PoC site in December as a security 
precaution because of the one-year anniversary of the beginning of the conflict. The IDPs 
believe this was requested by UNMISS leadership to stop them from being able to leave and 
re-enter the PoC site, forcing them to move to UN House. 
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from entering it on Monday, as it was described as a 
“military operation”. Soldiers were placed every 10 m of the 
perimeter, and the foreign nationals were put onto busses, 
and they claimed to the humanitarians they did not know 
where they were being taken at the time (Interview 79). 
They were moved elsewhere in Juba and stayed in hangars 
for another week while UNHCR asked them to select one 
of the options again. Not surprisingly, the decision to not 
inform the humanitarians working in UN House about the 
plan directly, or where the people were being taken, put a 
significant strain on the relationship between humanitarians 
working in the site and UNMISS.
These two case studies on Tongping and UN House 
illustrate the difficulties surrounding relocation and 
closure of PoC sites. There are no simple solutions and a 
contingent of people will almost always demand to remain, 
no matter the circumstances. Although the IDPs were 
eventually pleased with the move from Tongping to UN 
House, the tactics employed by UNMISS raises significant 
protection concerns. Attempts to move people to sites 
where humanitarians can offer better services, or where 
the land is better for shelters, is always a major challenge. 
Indeed, precedence exists within South Sudan itself with 
the attempt to move refugees in Upper Nile and Unity to 
different sites that were not prone to flooding. Because 
of the sensitivity of the matter, every stakeholder, from 
the mission to protection actors, need to be practical, 
flexible and transparent with each other. Local leaders in 
camps are usually dependent on the continuation of social 
and political structures and are unlikely to give up their 
positions of power easily.
Regardless, the unilateral decision by UNMISS to cut 
off basic services, like access to water, and the forced 
dismantling of shelters should not become accepted 
standards for future closures of PoC sites. Agreed 
guidelines should be in place for the closures of future 
sites, and all actors must improve communication and 
transparency with each other in their expectations on the 
best practice. 
Whether more PoC sites will be closed in the near 
future will heavily depend on both the success of 
the August 2015 peace agreement and the ability 
of IDPs to return with freedom of movement.
Closure of UN House PoC Site for 
Foreign National
Unlike the Tongping relocation, the foreign national section 
of UN House, known locally as PoC 2 UN House, was 
closed completely at the end of 2015. It was a unique 
situation as the people staying in the section were foreign 
nationals, not IDPs. At the beginning of the conflict, the 
shooting, looting and general security threats in Juba 
led some foreign nationals to also flee to UNMISS for 
protection. However, being foreign nationals, they were 
not perceived as sympathizers of SPLA-IO or as potential 
targets for security forces in Juba if forced to leave the 
camp. It was thus decided it was justified to close the site 
by the end of August 2015.
Due to their status as foreigners, UNHCR was also 
engaged. The people were given two options, either to 
move back to Juba town and apply for refugee status or 
move to Makpanda refugee camp in yambio, Western 
Equatoria, while their application for asylum would be 
processed (Interview 79). Each registered person was 
given USD 300 and those who moved to the refugee camp 
also received an NFI kit. A group of IDP representatives 
were brought to Makpanda camp to make an assessment, 
but their reports about the conditions in the camp were 
negative. As a result, only one third of the people signed up 
for one of the two options offered (Interview 79). 
When the original deadline of 31 August passed and people 
were still in the camp, it was decided to copy a tactic used 
in Tongping, in which people could leave the camp, but 
not be allowed to re-enter. As many of the displaced were 
shopkeepers, this directly restricted their livelihood and 
some moved to other sections of UN House PoC and set 
up shops there instead (Interview 79). Humanitarian staff 
claim that it was agreed that services would not be cut off 
until everyone left; however, on the evening of 31 August, 
UNMISS stopped the delivery of water to the camp starting 
the next day (Interview 79). Water had to be shipped into 
the site and it was decided by UNMISS that if the people 
had no water they would be forced to leave and be blocked 
from entering again. 
After three days, UNMISS leadership relented and allowed 
in some water trucks on 4 September (Interview 79). 
UNMISS then held more meetings to discuss what to do 
with the remaining 200 people, but, according to camp 
management, did not include or inform humanitarians of 
the decisions.66 On 5 September, several humanitarian 
organizations working in the camp learned by an UNMISS 
Twitter message that the remaining people would be 
forced to leave on Monday 7 September (Interview 79). 
The humanitarians working in the site were further banned 
UNMISS leadership interviewed were under the impression the humanitarians had been 
informed, but the NGOs deny they received any information following the meetings.
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Now Dinka have taken over houses and land that belonged to Nuer 
and there will be issues of land if peace comes and people want to return. 
- PoC Exit Strategies
Children play football in the Bor PoC site. Congested sites leave little space for recreation. © IOM 2015 Photo: Brendan Bannon
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Before the crisis, James lived and worked in Bor and 
thinks of Bor as his home. Since it was made the capital 
of Jonglei State it belongs to all the people of Jonglei 
and he intends to return to Bor town when peace comes 
back. In the past there was an unwritten policy that only 
Bor Dinka can only own land in Bor town, while other 
people groups have to rent it from them. Nuer working 
in Bor went and grabbed two blocks in Bor that were 
‘unclaimed’ at a place called Shinuar Ben and settled there 
and built houses, including James. Before the violence 
happened the state government was going to give those 
who lived there land deeds, but only some people have 
their land deeds as the crisis occurred before they all 
received them. Now Dinka have taken over houses and 
land that belonged to Nuer and there will be issues of 
land if peace comes and people want to return. If Nuer 
security forces return to Bor the Nuer IDPs will not fear 
leaving the PoC. However, those who are squatting on 
their land must leave and the Transitional Government 
of National Unity will need to solve this issue before 
people can return. Before the implementation of the 
peace deal the President is creating new states, but 
James doesn’t see this as legitimate as it is not part of the 
agreement between the parties. He believes the division 
of new state borders along ethnic lines will make more 
tensions and could lead to a continuation of conflict. 
An independent land management committee must be 
created to settle all the disputes that will arise with the 
returns. The state capitals, and Juba, are for all people 
and therefore the host community should not decide 
alone about land rights issues.
James
Bor PoC Site
50–60 years old, Nuer
"... the division of new state borders along 
ethnic lines will make more tensions and 
could lead to a continuation of conflict."
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The Peace Agreement
The discussions surrounding the PoC sites are mostly about the 
push for the return of the IDPs, once it is deemed safe outside 
the bases. The implementation of the peace agreement is moving 
slowly forward, with an advance team of SPLA-IO in Juba in early 
2016. Although many of the conditions listed in the agreement 
have yet to be implemented by either warring party, discussions on 
state-building and development are already on the lips of agencies 
and donors. As seen in the past, these aspirations often come at 
the cost of planning for other potential scenarios. While the current 
agreement is the best opportunity for peace in South Sudan, 
violence continues in parts of the country.
Most worryingly, the unilateral creation of 28 states by President 
Kiir, directly undermining the peace agreement, continues to 
move forward despite condemnation by the opposition and the 
international community. Although the population-at-large is divided 
in opinion regarding the new decree, the Nuer and Shilluk, the two 
ethnic groups most closely associated with the SPLA-IO, largely 
oppose it. Some question the legality of the decree, while others 
contest the redrawing of historical borders, in particular to expand 
Dinka territories at the cost of Nuer and Shilluk territories, including 
the most valuable locations with oil resources. These concerns 
are shared by experts who have compared the new borders with 
historical ones and analysed the economic and legal viability of the 
28 States Establishment Order.67 This decree will also have severe 
repercussions for the positions distributed to the SPLM/A-IO in the 
peace agreement and TGoNU, and the SPLA-IO is threatening to 
pull out of the agreement unless the decision is reversed. Many 
analysts believe this is the intention of the decree by the President 
due to his many objections regarding the agreement.
If the SPLA-IO does not pull out of the agreement, the precondition 
for the Government of South Sudan sharing power with the 
SPLM/A-IO is the loss of land and resources for their people, along 
with reduced influence in the TGoNU. The insistence by the head 
of the Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission (JMEC) that it 
will focus on the creation of the TGoNU and leave the state issue 
to be resolved later by the government itself is problematic.68  Land 
rights and territorial boundaries have historically been major conflict 
drivers in South Sudan, and it is highly unlikely the peace agreement 
will be sustainable if these disputes are not resolved.
With the exception of the Dinka IDPs in Malakal, the majority of IDPs 
in the PoC sites who were asked about the creation of the 28 states 
by President Kiir were strongly against its implementation (Interviews 
7, 9, 20, 23, 27, 31, 34, 59, 60, 65 and 75). In Malakal, many Shilluk 
civilians refused to accept the new borders, as they perceived it as 
a loss of historical territory. In Upper Nile, young Shilluk men said 
they desired peace, but, if the government insisted on implementing 
the 28 states, they would join Olony and fight for Shilluk land rights 
(Interview 65).69 Men in the PoC sites also believed the decree would 
lead to more conflict, and some even directly stated that they would 
refuse to acknowledge the new state borders and would go to war 
rather than accept them (Interviews 20, 23, 27). Nuer IDPs in the 
Bentiu, Bor, Juba and Malakal PoC sites also criticized the decree 
for undermining the peace agreement and insisted that it be revoked 
(Interviews 7, 9, 31, 34, 39, 60). Not surprisingly, this echoes the 
position of the SPLA-IO and Machar.70
If the 28 states decree is fully implemented, it will have major 
repercussions for the returns of IDPs from the PoC sites, even if 
the decree should ultimately be accepted by SPLA-IO and their ally, 
Olony. Many IDPs lived in the state capitals before they fled to the 
PoC sites and desire to return to them afterwards (Interviews 6, 7, 
24, 27). The new 28 states have been divided along ethnic lines, 
placing the former multi-ethnic state capitals of Bor and Malakal 
in so-called “Dinka” states. If IDPs cannot return to their previous 
residences, the possibility of returns will be severely challenged and, 
at best, significantly delayed. Since many of the displaced are from 
urban areas, they are more vulnerable and dependent on services if 
markets are not functional in areas of return. Coping mechanisms 
and social safety nets among the urban population are not as strong 
as those from rural areas, and their livelihoods and identity are often 
tied to urban settings. Indigenous knowledge about edible wild food 
plants, for example, is rare among those raised in urban areas.71 
Due to these challenges, IDPs who have lived in capital towns for 
years are not likely to return to rural villages if there is peace. 
IDP returns and the closure of PoC sites is a key priority for UNMISS 
leadership and DPKO headquarters. It must be recognized that, 
even if the peace agreement is implemented, many IDPs will remain 
in the PoC sites until other insecurities—such as food, shelter, 
economic and protection—are addressed. Aside from personal 
security, most IDPs face the challenge of restarting their lives after 
losing their possessions, livelihoods, land and livestock to the war. 
Many have nowhere to return to in the immediate future, even if they 
perceive that it is safe for them to leave the PoC sites. In the course 
of the conflict, different groups have occupied other clan and/or 
ethnic territories, and this will have to be carefully managed by the 
government to prevent further escalation of violence. 
DSRSG/RC/HC Eugene Owusu lists five factors that must be 
considered for potential returns: safety and security, service delivery, 
livelihood opportunities, community dialogue and reconciliation 
and political dynamics. Research by the International Refugee 
Rights Initiative found that the violence that drove the civilians to 
the UN bases still defines their relationship with people outside, 
and transitional justice and reconciliation are necessary to facilitate 
voluntary returns.72  Even if the TGoNU is formed, it is likely that 
the process could take months, if not years, especially considering 
the delays in the process already. Many IDPs reported that they 
would wait for a period of time after the Government is formed to 
determine if the agreement is sustainable before risking leaving the 
PoC sites. The uncomfortable truth is that planning for the PoC sites 
must remain long-term, even assuming the best case scenario of a 
fully implemented peace agreement.
- PoC Exit Strategies
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Top: teenagers play volleyball in the Bor PoC site. Bottom: born an IDP. © IOM 2015 Photos: Brendan Bannon
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The conflict has led to the loss of her father and 
eight brothers back home in Adok, Unity
- PoC Exit Strategies
The Tongping PoC site flooded due to heavy rains. IDPs slept at the food distribution site, the only dry piece of land. © IOM 2014 Photos: Martin Legasse
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On the morning of 16 December 16 2013, Dinka SPLA 
soldiers entered Mary’s house in Juba and immediately 
killed her brother-in-law. Mary, her two teenage 
daughters and three small children were then taken 
and walked for an hour and half to New Bongo (near 
Bilpham). Her family was added to another group of 
Dinka civilians and were waiting to see what was to be 
done with them. Fighting broke out nearby and the 
soldiers who took them ran to join in the fray, leaving the 
group unguarded.  Mary’s family and the other civilians 
all fled, initially thinking to run to the forest. On the 
way, a Nuer man who hid himself in his house saw them 
and asked where they were taking their children. When 
Mary said they did not know but were leaving Juba, he 
told them to go to UNMISS Tongping instead. As they 
were running, some Equatorians gave them water and 
told them to follow other people who were also going 
toward the Tongping base. They reached the east gate 
that evening and were allowed to enter the base. Six 
months later, Mary was selected to be part of the first 
group that relocated to UN House to build the shelters to 
prepare for the movement of other IDPs from Tongping. 
The conflict has led to the loss of her father and eight 
brothers back home in Adok, Unity, and every day Mary 
feels depressed thinking about them. Mary requested 
trauma-healing support for people in the camps who 
have lost family members.
Mary
Juba UN House PoC Site
25–35 years old, Nuer
Mary requested trauma-healing support 
for people in the camps...
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They did not want to go to the Malakal PoC site as there is no freedom there
and you cannot leave it without being targeted.
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Men gather to play and talk in the Malakal PoC site. © IOM 2015 Photo: Brendan Bannon
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The six men came from a village south of Malakal, but 
they moved to Wau Shilluk when the fighting began in 
December 2013. They did not want to go to the Malakal 
PoC site as there is no freedom there and you cannot 
leave the base without being targeted. After four months 
they moved to Kwadok for safety as the SPLA-IO was 
trying to advance to the west side of the Nile River. 
Once the SPLA-IO retreated a couple months later, they 
returned to Wau Shilluk.  
The men took their wives to the Malakal PoC site in 
August 2015 due to a lack of food.  They were surviving 
only on the leaves of the lalop tree and fish.  They paid 50 
SSP per person to a canoe operator to sneak them across 
the river at night. The UNMISS river battalion then 
escorted their families to the Malakal PoC site. Now it 
is only 30 SSP for a trip from Wau Shilluk to Malakal, 
but before it was much more dangerous and so it cost 
much more and could only be done in darkness. If the 
SPLA finds you, they can either take all your belongings 
or place a bullet in your stuff and accuse of you of being 
a soldier. The men send food and dried fish to their 
families in the PoC site through a relatives, and they call 
their wives to go meet them at the Nile River to pick it 
up. 
The men said they will leave their families in the PoC 
site until peace returns, but they are worried by the 28 
state decree by President Kiir. Unless that decision is 
reversed, the men predict that there will be renewed 
fighting. If there is peace, they will return to their village, 
but if they hear there will be war they will first move the 
women and children in Wau Shilluk away and then the 
men will join Olony to fight for their land rights. People 
are expecting to return to where they are from when 
there is peace, including those from the east side of the 
Nile.
Six Men
Wau Shilluk, a settlement site on the Nile 
10 km north of the Malakal PoC Site
20–40 years old, Shilluk
Girls hold hands in the Malakal PoC site. © IOM 2015 Photo: Brendan Bannon
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Conclusion
All actors need to learn from the past and plan for the future.
 
UNMISS and humanitarians have come together and assisted 
over 200,000 individuals within PoC sites. The sites are less than 
ideal, full of tribulations and a source of constant friction between 
humanitarians, IDPs and UNMISS.
Sacrifices have been made by UNMISS personnel to defend PoC 
sites from external threats and numerous humanitarians have been 
assaulted inside the sites; there is a common experience that exists 
and which has taken a toll, especially on IDPs. 
UNMISS is mandated by the UN Security Council to protect civilians, 
and humanitarians are mandated to save lives in a conflict—there 
is no end to saving lives in South Sudan, and, for now, PoC sites 
need to be prioritized as an essential part of an overall strategy of 
saving lives in South Sudan. 
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In light of the deterioration of the physical security of humanitarians working inside PoC sites and 
reduction of humanitarian space, CCCM advocates for a joint and united response from the humanitarian 
community working in relevant PoC sites. Underpinned by a collective commitment to the provision of 
services to communities affected by conflict, recognition is also made that each agency has the right to 
work and IDP’s have the right to receive assistance in a secure and non-confrontational environment. 
Collective concerns regarding the increased risk to humanitarians working within the PoC sites requires 
collective action have a cohesive and efficient response, that provides space for appropriate community 
engagement. This approach is not designed to be punitive in nature but afford humanitarians space to 
engage with communities as well as promote community responsibility for assaults and threats being 
placed on humanitarian workers.
Ground Rules for assaults and threats on humanitarians workers:
• All assaults and threats are to be reported to the Camp Manager (insert name, Phone #).
• Camp Manager will inform the appropriate Camp Administration (RRP).
• A timely meeting (preferably same day) will be arranged by the site manager with the 
operational humanitarian agencies present to discuss the incident, potential solution 
and collective action to be taken.
• Collective actions recommended may include a temporary suspension off all non-life 
saving  assistance and the removal of ‘at risk’ staff members. 
• Site manager and the humanitarian agencies will meet with the community 
representatives to find a collective solution. 
• In writing, the site manager will communicate the any outcomes and recommended 
collective actions for the issue to the service providers. 
• All stakeholders, including the implementing agency and UNMISS, must respect an 
individuals or organizations decision to not return to work if they do not feel secure.
• The site manager and camp administrator along with the humanitarian agencies will 
meet with the community and inform them of the decisions or consequences of the 
actions or events that have occurred. 
• The CCCM Cluster does not support the assault, intimidation or verbal abuse of any 
humanitarian staff member. Community leaders and POC populations need to be 
informed of the clear consequences of events or actions that occur within the POC.
Camp Management Agency
Signature of the Camp Manager
Date:
Service Provider
Signature of the Program officer
Date:
Service Provider
Signature of Country Director / Representative
Date:
Annex I - Mutual agreement on engagement with the IDPs after incident affecting 
humanitarian workers in the PoC sites
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Ground rules:
1. Humanitarians and IDPs have the right to work in a peaceful environment.
2. Humanitarians operate without a political bias and will provide support to all IDPs regardless of religion, 
ethnicity or political views. 
3. IDPs respect the implementing mandate and operational decisions of humanitarians.    
4. IDPs have the right to refuse services from any service provider (freedom of choice) but not to obstruct 
service provision or intimidate humanitarian workers. 
5. A two-way communication is allowed and acted upon by IDPs and humanitarians actors through different 
channels of communication such as camp committee meetings, community representative meetings or 
complaint / feedback mechanism.
6. IDPs are entitled to raise complaints and to get timely feedbacks to their complaints. 
7. Humanitarians have the right to refuse services to IDPs for serious misconduct including the following 
reasons:
- Verbal abuse   - threaths and harassement   - violent confrontations and asaults.
Implications if the rules are not abided by:
1. Camp management and service providers will meet to discuss and agree on the consequences of the 
incident and what measures will be taken by humanitarian partners (such as partial or complete suspension 
of services, exclusion made of life saving services). 
2. Camp management and community leaders will immediately meet to discuss the incident and the different 
parties involved. Humanitarians will inform the community leaders of any change to services in the event of 
a breach in ground rules.
Conditions for resumption of services:
1. Individuals responsible of the incident shall be identified to UNPOL.
2. Any stolen properties, goods are returned to the affected individuals or humanitarian organization.
3. Camp management along with the service providers will engage the community leadership in a meeting:
a. to understand and discuss the causes and triggers of the incident;
b. to find a solution;
c. to identify the collective measures necessary to avoid such incident to reoccur.
4. The community will need to express in writing the causes and the solutions.  
5. Camp management and the service provider will provide a written response on the restart date or the need 
for additional discussions or assurances.
6. The process of discussions, proposed solutions and written responses will continue until a mutually agreed 
upon resolution is found.
By signing this document, camp management and the community leadership pledge to work together, support the 
management structures and to keep services continued for as long as needed.
Camp Manager Name
Signature of the Program officer
Date:
Community Leaders Names
Signature
Date:
Annex II - Mutual agreement on engagement of humanitarians and the IDPs
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A)   UNMISS Responsibilities
1. Maintenance of physical security infrastructure of PoC sites (including perimeter berms, 
fencing, perimeter lighting, external patrol roads, gates, watch towers).
2. Construction of appropriate physical security infrastructure of new PoC sites (including 
perimeter berms, fencing, perimeter lighting, external patrol roads, gates, watch towers) 
– on a case by case basis, subject to availability of heavy engineering equipment and 
resources.
3. Secure the defined outer perimeter of the POC site against external threats, enabled by 
the full extent of the ROE.
4. Maintenance of public order inside PoC sites, incl. search operations, and destruction of 
seized items UNPOL.
5. Security screening of people entering and exiting PoC sites.
6. Provision of fencing materials for “reception areas” for IDP security screening.
7. Construction, maintenance and policing of holding facilities (excluding provision of 
services (health, sanitation, food) to detainees).
8. Operational coordination of security aspects of PoC operations (e.g. distributions, 
registrations, relocations, etc.) involving both UNMISS and humanitarian actors.
9. Provision of security for humanitarian operations as requested.
10. In line with the Mandate’s priority, conduct of protection operations outside the perimeter 
of the POC site to deter threat, reassure and protect IDPs. Operations are to be tailored 
to meet essential needs and scaled by all available capacity. This will include (but is not 
limited to) security for vulnerable groups to enable firewood and water collection, market 
visits, burials and relocations, etc.
11. Negotiating with the Government regarding land for PoC sites, where possible meeting 
Sphere Standards.
12. Access to existing facilities in support of PoC site management, specifically medical 
waste incinerators, or temporary morgue facilities (dependent on capacity).
13. Joint contingency planning for PoC site support in emergencies, in particular fire-fighting 
and support to emergency water provision.
14. Support to air transportation of PoC site-related humanitarian goods and equipment as a 
last resort and subject to cost-recovery.
15. Provision of heavy machinery for humanitarian construction work in PoC sites, subject to 
availability and capacity.
16. Provision of land for humanitarian workspace and accommodation.
17. Community coordination and liaison with PoC site representatives on issues such as site 
security management and public order.
18. Joint planning for PoC site closure and decommissioning/dismantling of site infrastruc-
ture and shelters.
MSD
MSD
Force
Force
DSS / UNPOL
MSD
CAS
RRP
DSS / Force / UNPOL
Force / RRP
RRP
MSD
DSS / MSD / RRP
MSD
MSD
MSD
RRP / UNPOL
RRP /MSD
Annex III - Responsibilities in UNMISS POC Sites for Planning and Budgetary Purposes
#    Activity    Mission Section(s)
This Annex with roles and responsibilities with regard to operations in Protection of Civilian Sites (PoC sites) was developed 
after consultation between the relevant UNMISS sections, OCHA, and the Humanitarian Country Team (HCT) for planning and 
budgetary purposes. This delineation should be read in conjunction with the UNMISS operational guidance on SCR 2155 4(C), 
“creating the conditions for the delivery of humanitarian assistance”, and “CCCM and UNMISS, Roles and Responsibilities” 
and the “Division of Roles and Responsibilities between UNMISS and the HCT in UNMISS POC Sites” matrix, which provide 
additional detail to activities associated with PoC sites.
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B)   Humanitarian Responsibilities
C)   Joint Responsibilities
19. Conduct of assisted dismantling operations in the context of relocations.
20. Joint training, support to, and liaison with community watch groups.
21. Provision of emergency health services to (ex-)combatants arriving at UNMISS bases 
(and are seen as hostile by IDPs inside the POC site and cannot use the same POC 
health facilities) as required and for other IDPs in emergency cases and as a last resort.
1. PoC site planning and consultation on plans with UNMISS.
2. All internal PoC site earthworks and engineering, including roads, backfilling, and 
drainage.
3. Supply of infrastructure, services and supplies for the ‘humanitarian hubs’ and other 
humanitarian work places, including security, bunkers, electricity, plumbing, sewage, 
water and cooking facilities, connectivity.
4. Provision of PoC site communal facilities for IDP.
5. IDP community organization, information and community outreach, liaison on humanitar-
ian operations and other PoC site issues.
6. Registration of IDPs.
7. PoC site water supply (incl. quality and quantity control and distribution, sanitation, 
development of boreholes and on-site storage); provision of hygiene facilities, including 
water points, latrines, showers, washing stations, and operation of sewage trucks.
8. Solid and liquid waste disposal from PoC sites.
9. Provision of food , NFIs and shelter building materials for IDPs.
10. Provision of all health services for IDPs, including referrals, with UNMISS providing only 
emergency, last-resort support. 
11. Education for IDPs.
12. Contingency and scenario planning regarding humanitarian operations.
13. Timely burial of IDPs, including transport off-base.
14. Transport for IDP relocation operations.
RRP / UNPOL / Force
UNPOL / RRP
MSD
CCCM
CCCM
CCCM
CCCM
CCCM
WASH
WASH
FSL / NFI
Health / Nutrition
Education
OCHA / CCCM
Health / CCCM
IOM
#    Activity    
#    Activity    
#    Activity    
Cluster
Mission Section(s)
Actors
1. Contingency and scenario planning for PoC sites. 
2. Planning for relocations and closure of PoC sites.
3. Support to and liaison with community watch groups. 
CCCM/OCHA / RRP-JOC / 
MSD / DSS / UNPOL / Force
CCCM / RRP
UNPOL
CCCM
Transport for IDP relocation 
operations
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